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professions as distinct from regulation of professional speech? This Article provides a
comprehensive account of the doctrinal and theoretical bases of professional speech and its
application to controversial First Amendment questions.
First Amendment protection for professional speech rests on distinctive theoretical
justifications, and the key to understanding professional speech lies in understanding the
character of the learned professions. This Article suggests that the professions should be thought
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INTRODUCTION
Professionals speak; some speak a lot. Lawyers use verbal communication
to exercise their profession. So do psychologists. Medical advice is dispensed
via such communication as well. The list goes on. The content of these
communications, we intuitively assume, is protected. The scope of protection,
however, is elusive. At the same time, the state can regulate the professions.
Traditional forms of regulation include licensing requirements, advertising
regulations, and the imposition of professional malpractice liability. But new
forms of regulation go further: they target the content of the communication
between a professional and her client. Sometimes, such regulation aligns with
professional insights, but sometimes it contradicts them. The resulting tension
between state regulation of the professions and professionals' free speech
interests remains underexplored.
Recent cases involving professional speech' have made this tension
apparent. Can the State of California and the State of New Jersey ban sexual
orientation change efforts (SOCE)? Can the State of South Dakota require
that abortion providers read to their patients a legislatively drafted statement
that does not correspond to the current state of medical science?' In other
words: do psychologists have a First Amendment right to engage in conversion
therapy? Do physicians have a First Amendment right not to be compelled to
make state-scripted, erroneous claims about abortion to their patients? These
examples represent potential infringements on a professional's right to free
1. Following Daniel Halberstam and Robert Post, I will refer to "professional speech" as
speech "uttered in the course of professional practice" as distinct from "speech ... uttered
by a professional." Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 843 (1999); Robert Post,
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007
U. Il. L. REV. 939, 947 [hereinafter Post, Informed Consent to Abortion].
2. See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup 1), 728 F.3d 1042 (9 th Cir. 2013) (upholding the California law
prohibiting licensed mental health providers from providing SOCE therapy to children
under eighteen against a First Amendment challenge), affid, remanded, and reh'g denied, 74o
F.3 d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014); King v. Christie (King 1), 981 F.
Supp. 2d 296 (D.N.J. 2013) (upholding the New Jersey conversion therapy ban), af'd sub
nom., King v. Governor of N.J. (King II), 767 F-3 d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2048 (2015); see also Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518 (D.N.J. 2014) (same).
3. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 1l), 686 F.3 d 889 (8th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (upholding the South Dakota informed consent statute requiring abortion
providers to warn against an alleged increased risk of suicide).
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speech. But federal appellate courts have taken opposing approaches to
indistinguishable questions.4
What is strikingly-and perhaps somewhat surprisingly-still absent from
the case law and the legal literature is a comprehensive theory of professional
speech.s The Supreme Court has never identified, with any clear boundaries,
the category of professional speech. Nonetheless, it is implicit in a number of
decisions involving government-funded speech,6 commercial speech,' and
other areas.8 This Article seeks to fill the lacuna left by courts and scholars by
offering an account of the doctrinal and theoretical bases of professional speech
and its application to controversial First Amendment questions.
First Amendment protection for professional speech, I argue, rests on
distinctive theoretical justifications, and the key to understanding professional
speech lies in understanding the character of the so-called "learned"
professions. These learned professions, I submit, should be thought of as
knowledge communities, that is, communities whose principal raison d'8tre is
the generation and dissemination of knowledge.' Conceptualizing the
professions as knowledge communities not only informs the theoretical
justifications for First Amendment protection"o but also the limits of that
4. Compare Pickup 1, 728 F.3d 1042 (upholding California's conversion therapy law as a
permissible regulation of conduct), with King II, 767 F.3d 216 (upholding New Jersey's
conversion therapy law as a permissible regulation of speech).
5. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 772 ("[W]e still have ... no paradigm for the First
Amendment rights of attorneys, physicians, or financial advisers when they communicate
with their clients."); id. at 834-35 ("[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely
addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional's freedom to speak to a client.
Accordingly, courts have failed to develop a general method for reviewing restrictions on
professional speech."); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note i, at 947 (explicitly
abstaining from offering a comprehensive theory of the "constitutional status of professional
speech"); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, "Situation Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1342-43 (2005) ("[C]ourts need to develop First Amendment standards to judge the
constitutionality of laws that restrict professionals' speech to clients.").
6. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991).
7. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (lawyer direct mailing to victims);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (lawyer in-person solicitation); Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (newspaper advertisements for legal services);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertising for abortion services).
8. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (mentioning
abortion providers' First Amendment rights "as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State").
9. See infra Section I.A.i.
io. See infra Part II.
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protection, the permissibility of regulating the professions, and the imposition
and extent of tort liability for professional malpractice." Imposing professional
malpractice liability has never been found to offend the First Amendment.
Why that is so, however, merits further investigation. Conceptualizing the
learned professions as knowledge communities guides this undertaking.
Professionals speak not only for themselves but also as members of a
learned profession: they "assist[] individuals in making personal choices based
on the cumulative knowledge of the profession."" The professions as
knowledge communities thus function in a way akin to what Paul Horwitz
calls "First Amendment institutions."" First Amendment scholars concerned
with professional speech have hinted at the connection between the professions
and institutions' but have yet to provide a full explication. This Article takes
on that task.
My analysis abuts and engages the emerging institutionalist First
Amendment literature."s In my account, it is the institutionalization of
professional discourse that builds the basis for the knowledge community.
The subsequent dissemination of that knowledge within the professional-client
relationship ties the individual professional back to the knowledge community.
That the individual professionals are bound together by the knowledge
community is also the underlying assumption of professional malpractice
law, in which the knowledge community's standard of care determines the
benchmark against which the individual professional's liability is assessed.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a definition of
professional speech, with particular attention to the role of the learned
professions as knowledge communities. It then situates professional speech in
ii. See infra Part III.
12. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 773.
13. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 247-54 (2012) (discussing professional
speech within "the borderlands of institutionalism"). Halberstam appears to make a similar
proposal when he speaks about "First Amendment protection of relational speech
institutions," Halberstam, supra note 1, at 851, although he does not consider professional
associations but rather the bounded nature of the professional-client relationship as the
basis for identifying the institutionalized nature of the speech. My approach is perhaps best
characterized as situated between these two. See infra Section I.A.i. Moreover, I do not
necessarily subscribe to all First Amendment institutionalist implications. I do not aim to
give an institutional account across the First Amendment; nor do I confine the
institutionalization to the professional-client relationship.
14. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 350 n.38 (explaining the connection between law,
medicine, and journalism and the university).
1s. See, e.g., id. at 9; Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89




the doctrinal context of the First Amendment. Commentators have analyzed
professional speech primarily in relation to - and by analogy with - commercial
speech,' 6 which has received increasingly robust First Amendment protection. 7
But the underlying comparison, I argue, is tenuous. The speech interests are
fundamentally different. The doctrinal fate of professional speech, therefore,
ought not to be tied to that of commercial speech.
Part II undertakes a normative defense of First Amendment protection for
professional speech. The traditional justifications for speech protection apply
in a distinctive fashion to professional speech. Professional speech is unique in
the way it implicates the autonomy interests of both the speaker and the
listener. I will call "decisional autonomy interests" the interests of the listener
who depends on the information provided by a professional to make an
informed decision.' 8  The professional-client relationship is typically
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge. The client seeks the
professional's advice precisely because of this asymmetry. At the same time, the
agency of the listener requires that the ultimate decision rest with her. The
other autonomy interests are those of the speakers, which I will call
"professional autonomy interests." The qualifier "professional" signals that it is
not the autonomy interest to freely express one's personal opinions that is at
stake-as is the case in most free speech theory-but rather to express one's
professional opinion as a member of the knowledge community.
Turning then to marketplace considerations, I argue that the classic notion
of a "free trade in ideas"" has little purchase as between the professional and
the client. The professional does not seek to subject her professional opinion to
"the competition of the market"' when speaking within the confines of the
professional-client relationship. Yet, there is a dimension to the marketplace
idea in the professional speech context that is generally underappreciated and
16. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note i, at 838; Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at
974-90. But see Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 239 (1994) (asserting that
"conversations between doctors and patients about diagnosis and treatments are not
commercial speech" but providing no analysis explaining why that is the case).
17. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
is. The Court's failure to consider the patient's interest in receiving information has been
repeatedly criticized in the reproductive rights context. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 219-
20.
ig. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . .
2o. Id.
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comes into relief when the professions are thought of as knowledge
communities. Within the discourse of the knowledge community itself- that
is, outside the professional-client relationship-a marketplace of ideas exists,
which we might call an epistemic marketplace. Professional standards are
generated by testing insights in that marketplace. The current state of the
knowledge community's discourse provides the foundation for the
professional's advice.
Finally, theories of democratic self-government also provide a normative
basis for the protection of professional speech. The information that the
knowledge community communicates to clients through individual
professionals cumulatively enhances the basis upon which public opinion is
formed. This is not simply a matter of enabling self-government through
ordinary deliberation by adding another opinion to the public discussion.
Rather, professionals contribute specialized, technical knowledge to which lay
citizens would not otherwise have access. It is precisely in their capacity as
members of knowledge communities that professionals enhance the process of
self-governance, and so as members of knowledge communities that they
should enjoy First Amendment protection.
Part III considers the appropriate limits on professional speech. It
interrogates the extent to which the state may regulate the professions'
educational and knowledge standards. It also considers the interplay between
the First Amendment and tort liability for professional malpractice. In order to
avoid malpractice liability, professionals must exercise their profession
according to the degree and skill of a well-qualified professional. For example,
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states, "[A] lawyer
who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances."' It is thus the knowledge
community that determines the standard of care. This Part engages
contemporary tort scholarship that incorporates this insight by focusing on the
profession's distinctive expertise. ' This emerging approach mirrors my
concern with granting deference to the knowledge community's insights.
The extent of tort liability, I argue, should be consistent with the scope of
protection of the knowledge community's discourse under the First
Amendment. Only if liability and protection are coextensive can this liability
mechanism yield fair results. If liability is properly measured against the
standard of care determined by the profession, the knowledge community's
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 5 52(1) (AM. LAw INST. 2000).
22. See Alex Stein, Toward a Theory ofMedical Malpractice, 97 IOWAL. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (2012);
see also Eleanor D. Kinney, What Does New Theory Contribute to the Evolution of the Tort of




formation of this standard should remain uncorrupted and its application
within the professional-client relationship should receive robust First
Amendment protection.
Part IV applies this approach to controversial First Amendment disputes,
returning to the cases referenced at the outset. In so doing, it considers how the
theory of professional speech focused on knowledge communities plays out in
litigation terms, a question that traditionally remains underexamined in the
First Amendment literature.
State regulation interacts with knowledge communities' insights in
multiple and varied ways. It sometimes reinforces professional knowledge, and
it sometimes contradicts such knowledge. The questions raised in cases
challenging regulations that contradict professional knowledge play out against
the larger jurisprudential backdrop concerning the role of legislative findings of
fact. Whose knowledge should state regulation rely on? The knowledge
community theory of professional speech provides a conceptual framework to
assess this question. This theory of professional speech, informed by the role of
knowledge communities, thus allows us to reconceptualize how we think about
government involvement in professional speech. Under this view, to borrow
loosely from Alexander Meiklejohn, the First Amendment is directed against
the "mutilation of the thinking process" of the knowledge community."
1. SITUATING PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
When a lawyer advises a client, she engages in professional speech.
Likewise, when a physician advises a patient, she engages in professional
speech. Scholarship and case law seem to assume, almost intuitively, that
professional speech exists. But the instinct that professional speech is
distinctive as a category of speech, and the way in which it is distinctive, is not
sufficiently explained in the case law or First Amendment theory.
This Part first explores the character and function of the professions
before distinguishing professional speech from professionals' private speech
and from government speech. Throughout this Article, I argue that the
professions should be thought of as knowledge communities. The role of
knowledge communities defines the type of speech that ought to be protected
from outside - particularly, state - interference, and the extent to which state
regulation of the professions is permissible.
23. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27 (1960) ("It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.").
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This Part then situates professional speech in First Amendment doctrine.
The concept is implicit in numerous Supreme Court decisions, though it is not
identified as a separate category of speech. Courts and scholars sometimes
analogize professional speech to commercial speech, which is increasingly
receiving First Amendment protection from state interference. While a
heightened level of protection is desirable as a doctrinal matter in the
professional speech context as well, the underlying analogy is tenuous. In
questioning the analogy between commercial speech and professional speech, I
suggest that professional speech more than commercial speech should receive
robust First Amendment protection.
A. What Is Professional Speech?
The First Amendment fragments speech. We treat different types of speech
differently all the time.2 But to the extent we treat professional speech
differently for different professions - thus distinguishing between speakers
engaged in arguably the same type of speech- differential treatment is
problematic. For example, why should the speech of a lawyer be more
protected than that of a physician?" Nonetheless, the level of attention
afforded to the regulation of professional speech varies significantly across
professions. First Amendment questions surrounding lawyers' professional
speech, for instance, remained largely unexplored until recently. 6 Legislative
interference with physician speech, conversely, has received comparatively
more attention.27
24. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1263 ("[l]t seems a permissible
generalization to conclude that First Amendment doctrine has been hesitant to draw lines
between or among speakers or between or among communicative institutions, preferring
overwhelmingly to demarcate the First Amendment along lines representing different types
of speech.").
25. Some have argued that lawyers' professional speech deserves special protection because of
the role lawyers play in society. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First
Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 639, 712 (2011) ("Given the integral role of attorneys in
America's democratic government, it seems reasonable, if not imperative, that this category
of speech - attorney advice - should be fiercely guarded from unnecessary regulation.");
Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 27, 36 (2011) ("[A]ttorney free speech is essential to the proper functioning of the
United States justice system."). But see W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 305, 313 (2001) ("[N]o single model of lawyering theory can account
for the function of lawyers in our society.").
26. Knake, supra note 25, at 646.
27. See generally Berg, supra note 16, at 2o6 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's regulation of
physician speech and developing "a First Amendment theory of doctor-patient discourse




Unlike other analyses focused on specific professions,' I aim to develop a
broad conceptual approach to professional speech. Doing so avoids creating
professional speech silos within the First Amendment and the subsequent
problem of sorting professional speech into subcategories. A unified approach
to professional speech also shields some professions from being "especially
vulnerable to excess constriction by judges and juries too concerned with the
moral or social undesirability of those . . . carrying the First Amendment
claim."29 Consider, for example, the situation of reproductive health care
providers. There may be less desire to protect professional speech concerned
with abortion-and more tolerance for government demands to read
inaccurate, legislatively drafted scripts, compelled descriptions of mandatory
ultrasounds and the like-based on moral disapproval.3o But if professional
speech is worthy of protection as such, then the underlying topic of the speech
is irrelevant to its protection. A unified approach to professional speech, then,
provides protection for all professional speech.
I submit that the kind of professional speech worthy of protection,
irrespective of the particular profession involved, includes three core elements:
(1) a knowledge community's insights, (2) communicated by a professional
within the professional-client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing
professional advice. The first element concerns the role of knowledge
information and advice"); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1 (analyzing "the
First Amendment principles that should apply to compelled physician speech").
28. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16; Tarkington, supra note 25; Wendel, supra note 25, at 306
(pointing out "the categorization problems presented by lawyers' speech").
29. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1268. This approach differs markedly
from others in its sole focus on professional speech. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 25, at 308
(arguing in favor of an approach that also considers other "expressive-rights" contexts
involving lawyers).
3o. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175 (2014);
Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1724, 1764 (1995) (asserting
that "the Court has been less willing to extend First Amendment protection to speech
related to [abortion]"); Wells, supra, at 1759-60 ("[Abortion] is an activity that many people
find abhorrent and corrupt. . . . Supreme Court Justices are not immune from such personal
views. As a portion of the Court has indicated, 'Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality."' (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))). See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and
the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985). Vincent Blasi observes that some
periods of time are more "pathological" than others, and in these pathological time periods,
there exist "certain dynamics that radically increase the likelihood that people who hold
unorthodox views will be punished for what they say or believe." Blasi, supra, at 450. Blasi's
central thesis is that "[t]he first amendment ... should be targeted for the worst of times" to
assure that speech is protected. Blasi, supra.
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communities; the second and third elements distinguish the context and
purpose. I will address these elements in turn.
1. The Role ofKnowledge Communities
The connection to a knowledge community circumscribes the type of
communication rendered as professional advice. Not all occupations are
considered professions. There are certain core professions we intuitively think
of, medicine and law traditionally chief among them." Psychologists, dentists,
pharmacists, and accountants-to only name a few-are likely part of the
group as well. The list has expanded historically, and some occupations that
were once considered only marginally professionalized have now come to be
understood as professions.' The process of professionalization is contested,
and I do not aim to offer my own theory. Rather, I am concerned with the
question of what First Amendment protection for professional speech looks
like once an occupation has attained professional status. Thus, for the
remainder of this Article, whatever the current debates are at the margins, I am
primarily concerned with the core professions. And although the clergy is
historically considered the third quintessential learned profession next to
31. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 7 (1976)
("At one time the learned professions were those of theology, law, and medicine.");
Maxwell J. MehIman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1165, 1225 (2012) ("Medicine is one of the three classic learned professions, the other two
being law and the clergy.").
32. The historical development is evident in this 1964 enumeration from the sociology
literature:
Established solidly since the late Middle Ages have been law, the clergy,
university teaching (although the church did dominate universities, medieval
faculty were by no means all clergy), and to some extent medicine (especially in
Italy). During the Renaissance and after, the military provided professional
careers . . . . Dentistry, architecture, and some areas of engineering (e.g., civil
engineering) were professionalized by the early 19oo's; certified public
accounting and several scientific and engineering fields came along more recently.
Some are still in process -social work, correctional work, veterinary medicine,
perhaps city planning and various managerial jobs for nonprofit organizations-
school superintendents, foundation executives, administrators of social agencies
and hospitals. There are many borderline cases, such as schoolteaching,
librarianship, nursing, pharmacy, optometry. Finally, many occupations will
assert claims to professional status and find that the claims are honored by no one
but themselves. I am inclined to place here occupations in which a market
orientation is overwhelming-public relations, advertising, and funeral directing.




medicine and law," I explicitly exclude that group from my discussion of
professions and professional speech.'
Definitions of "the professions" vary,35 but the most relevant defining
feature for present purposes -and one generally shared among the numerous
definitions - is their knowledge-based character. 6  As we have already
33. See supra text accompanying note 31.
34. Aside from the protection of religious speech otherwise afforded by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, it seems problematic to fit the clergy into the knowledge
community concept, particularly across denominations. Exclusive claims to ultimate truth
will be difficult to reconcile with a knowledge community's underlying shared notions of
validity and a common way of knowing and reasoning.
35. See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 4o ARiz. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) ("The terms 'profession'
and 'professionalism' have an incredibly large and vaguely bounded range of meanings, the
despair of sociology, the discipline that has done most to study the professions."); see also,
e.g., HORwITZ, supra note 13, at 247 (offering James Brundage's definition of a profession as
"a line of work that . .. claims to promote the interests of the whole community as well as
the individual worker, that requires mastery of a substantial body of esoteric knowledge,
and that is closely bounded by a body of ethical rules different from and more demanding
than those incumbent on all respectable members of society"); Norman Bowie, The Law:
From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741, 743 (1988) (providing Abraham
Flexner's "classic definition of a profession" that "an occupation must: (i) possess and draw
upon a store of knowledge that was more than ordinarily complex; (2) secure a theoretical
grasp of the phenomena with which it dealt; (3) apply its theoretical and complex
knowledge to the practical solution of human and social problems; (4) strive to add to and
improve its stock of knowledge; (5) pass on what it knew to novice generations not in a
haphazard fashion but deliberately and formally; (6) establish criteria of admission,
legitimate practice, and proper conduct; and (7) be imbued with an altruistic spirit" (citing
Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?)); Wilensky, supra note 32, at 138 ("The job of
the professional is technical-based on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only
through long prescribed training .... The professional man adheres to a set of professional
norms.").
For examples from the sociology literature on professions, see, for example, ANDREW
ABBOrr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988);
ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY (1994);
MAGAI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1977); and KEITH M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS (1995). For historical
perspectives, see JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS (2008); and ELuIoTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE
GURDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT
(1996). In the legal literature, see Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 241 (2012).
36. Cf Bowie, supra note 35, at 743 ("Flexner's first four criteria for a profession require the
mastery of a complex body of knowledge."). It might be debatable whether the possession
of actual knowledge is in fact necessary. Discussing "professional mystique," Richard
Posner -citing the lack of real therapeutic knowledge in medicine "in the Middle Ages in
Italy, where medicine was a highly prestigious profession"- suggests that "[t]he key to
classifying an occupation as a profession .. . is not the actual possession of specialized,
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observed, the professional-client relationship is asymmetric: the professional
has knowledge the client does not have, which leads the client to seek out her
advice. The reason the professional's advice is valuable to the client is that she
possesses knowledge that the client lacks."
Because the professions are knowledge-based, I contend that they should
be thought of as knowledge communities. Individual professionals "may differ
in their individual judgments about particular issues, [but] their role as
professionals traditionally implies their subscription to a body of knowledge
that is shared among their peers.""'
What are knowledge communities?" I use the term to describe a network
of individuals who share common knowledge and experience as a result of
socially valuable knowledge; it is the belief that some group has such knowledge . . . ."
Posner, supra note 35, at 2. But "[t]he fact that a profession cultivates professional mystique
does not prove that it lacks real knowledge; modern medicine is a case in point." Posner,
supra, at 4; see also Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 35 (1992) (identifying the professions as a knowledge-based
group).
37. See Bowie, supra note 35, at 743-44 ("Walter Metzger, addressing the question 'What Is A
Profession?,' argued that 'the paramount function of professions ... is to ease the problems
caused by the relentless growth of knowledge.' . . . In a complex world, people become
increasingly ignorant of information necessary to run their lives. The job of the professional
is to protect the client from his or her own ignorance."); see also King v. Governor of N.J.
(King 11), 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) ("Licensed professionals, through their education
and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that their clients usually do
not. Indeed, the value of the professional's services stems largely from her ability to apply
this specialized knowledge to a client's individual circumstances."); Steven Brint,
Professionals and the "Knowledge Economy": Rethinking the Theory of Postindustrial Society, 49
CURRENT Soc. 101, 116 (2001) (including in the discussion of "knowledge-centered"
industries those "industries in which the primary activity is providing service to clients and
the knowledge necessary for providing the service is embedded in the providers themselves
(as in the medical, education and legal services industries)").
38. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 772; see also Brint, supra note 37, at 130 n.9 (discussing sociology
literature indicating that "many professionals ... do not use much expert knowledge on
their jobs. Studies of two leading professions, doctors and lawyers, show that rank-and-file
practitioners frequently rely on standard reference works and accumulated experience as a
basis for many of their decisions." (citing DANIEL B. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS (1979) and DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983))). Brint's observation would suggest a very close
connection of the individual professional to the knowledge community in day-to-day
operations.
39. My definition of "knowledge community" builds on various definitions of that concept
offered in the management and social science literature and draws on related concepts, such
as "epistemic communities" or "epistemic institutions." See, e.g., Ash Amin & Joanne
Roberts, Knowing in Action: Beyond Communities ofPractice, 37 REs. POL. 353, 359-61 (2oo8)
(discussing "professional knowing"); Mai'a K. Davis Cross, Rethinking Epistemic




training and practice.o They are engaged in solving similar problems by
drawing on a shared reservoir of knowledge, which, at the same time, they help
define and to which they contribute. Their common understandings allow for
the generation and exchange of insights within the community. Consequently,
members of knowledge communities have shared notions of validity' and a
common way of knowing and reasoning (consider the old adage of "thinking
like a lawyer").' Additionally, the knowledge community shares certain norms
and values: professional norms. This is not to say that knowledge communities
are monolithic. But their shared notions of validity limit the range of acceptable
opinions found within them.
The connection to a knowledge community is a distinctive feature of the
role of professionals. In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit considered the
question of professional speech protection for the "spiritual counselor"
(fortune teller) known as Psychic Sophie, who assertedly engaged in providing
predictive advice just like a lawyer. 3 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Justice
White's concurrence in Lowe v. SEC, stated: "Professional speech analysis
applies . . . where a speaker 'takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and
purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's
individual needs and circumstances' . . . ."' This definition of professional
speech allowed the court to conclude that Psychic Sophie's "activities fit
comfortably within the confines of professional speech analysis."4s Whether or
not this assessment of her profession is accurate,46 it importantly lacks the
connection to a knowledge community.
epistemic communities and professions); Michael Earl, Knowledge Management Strategies:
Toward a Taxonomy, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYs. 215, 223-25 (2001) (discussing knowledge
communities in the oil industry); Haas, supra note 36, at 3 & n.4 (defining epistemic
communities and their interrelatedness with professions).
4o. See Haas, supra note 36, at 18-19 (explaining that professions have shared causal beliefs and
a consensual knowledge base).
41. Cf id. at 3 (including professions in his discussion of knowledge-based groups whose
members may share criteria of validity).
42. Cf id. at 16 (discussing analytic methods and techniques of professions).
43. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2013). See generally
Volokh, supra note s, at 1345 n.352 (discussing fortune teller cases).
44. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (citations omitted) (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1985)).
45. Id.
46. Cf Posner, supra note 35, at 5 ("Sorcery and prophecy enjoy professional status in many
primitive societies, and are overthrown when practitioners face competition from groups
that use rational methods.").
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First Amendment scholars concerned with professional speech have hinted
at the connection between the professions and institutions.' This emerging
institutionalist First Amendment literature is concerned with colleges and
universities, libraries, and the press.8 But knowledge communities, while
related to these institutions, are in a sense less "institutionalized."
Their most institutionalized incarnations are professional associations. The
Fourth Circuit, for example, invoked the presence or absence of "accrediting
institution[s] like a board of law examiners or medical practitioners" in the
Psychic Sophie case.49 Likewise, Justice Breyer in dissent once noted that when
speech "is subject to independent regulation by canons of the profession[s] ...
the government's own interest in forbidding that speech is diminished."o My
account of the role of knowledge communities in the professional speech
context makes sense of these intuitions. But professional norms are generated
outside of these associations as well. Conferences and the professional
literature, for example, are sites of professional knowledge formation, even
though they are not necessarily embodied in specific institutions or
professional associations.s"
Of course, professional associations have held, at one point or another,
positions they now consider erroneous or outdated. For instance, the American
Medical Association was at the forefront of the campaign to criminalize
abortion in the nineteenth century," and the American Psychological
47. See, e.g., HORWITz, supra note 13, at 350 n.38.
48. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1274-75. Frederick Schauer also
includes "scientific research that does not have a home within a university" as an analog. Id.
According to Schauer, "For all of these institutions, the argument would be that the virtues
of special autonomy- special immunity from regulation -would in large part serve
important purposes of inquiry and knowledge acquisition, and that those purposes are not
only socially valuable, but also have their natural (or at least most comfortable) home within
the boundaries of the First Amendment." Id.
Paul Horwitz also includes churches and associations in his discussion. See HORwITz,
supra note 13, at 107-238.
49. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 570 (further stating that where such accrediting institutions do not
exist, "a legislature may reasonably determine that additional regulatory requirements are
necessary").
so. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (20o6) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
si. While outside of the professional-client relationship, and therefore outside of the immediate
scope of this discussion, the speech interests of professionals speaking to each other are
similar to those underlying academic speech. See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY,
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE
MODERN STATE 61-93 (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY].
52. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective




Association (APA) did not declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder until
1973.s But the professions themselves can and do revise their positions on the
basis of their ongoing intellectual development, as these examples attest." In
adopting, changing, or updating these positions, the knowledge communities
use their own professional standards, elaborated by and through their own
community.ss
Knowledge communities have specialized expertise and are closest to those
affected; they must have the freedom to work things out for themselves. The
professions as knowledge communities have a fundamental interest in not
having the state (or anyone else, for that matter) corrupt or distort what
amounts to the state of the art in their respective fields.s6 This is the key feature
of professional discourse and the limiting principle of professional speech. The
resulting benefit is the generation of insights within the knowledge community
that would not otherwise occur. As knowledge communities, then, the
professions should be granted deference.' But where knowledge
communities - and, by extension, individual professionals - do not possess
such specialized knowledge or competence, such deference is not required as a
matter of professional speech. No amount of specialized training, for instance,
by itself makes a professional more competent to render value judgments.
The individual professional is linked to the knowledge community in
multiple ways. She "is understood to be acting under a commitment to the
ethical and intellectual principles governing the profession and is not thought
of as free to challenge the mode of discourse or the norms of the profession
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 4
STAN. L. REv. 261, 280-318 (1992).
53. HoRwTz, supra note 13, at 352 n-51.
54. See id. (pointing out that the APA declassified homosexuality "not as a result of legal
pressure but in response to changing professional views and broader social norms").
ss. This mechanism is analogous to that described in epistemic communities: "In response to
new information generated in their domain of expertise, epistemic community members
may still engage in internal and often intense debates leading to a refinement of their ideas
and the generation of a new consensus about the knowledge base." Haas, supra note 36, at
18.
56. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 773 ("The State may ensure professionals' faithfulness to the
public aspects of their calling, but it may not usurp their role or determine independently
the bodies of knowledge that may be accessed or the individual judgments that may be
rendered in a given case.").
57. Cf Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech justifications, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 119, 136 (1989) ("There is
also wide agreement that advancement in understanding among persons capable of
assessing scientific claims is promoted by freedom of communication within the scientific
community, that government intervention to suppress some scientific ideas in favor of
others would not promote scientific truth.").
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while remaining within the parameters of the professional discussion."5" The
individual professional thus serves as the conduit between the knowledge
community and the client. Malpractice liability likewise assumes this
connection in imposing the profession's standard of care on the individual
professional.s"
I will return to the role of professional associations and state involvement
in regulating the professions in Part III. For now, conceptualizing the
professions as knowledge communities allows us to focus our discussion on
professional speech as distinct from other forms of speech.
2. Distinguishing Private Speech
Turning to the second and third constitutive elements of professional
speech - (2) that it is communicated by a professional within the professional-
client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing professional advice-it is
fundamentally important to recognize that professional speech is not private
speech. Daniel Halberstam and Robert Post define professional speech as
"'speech . . . uttered in the course of professional practice,' as distinct from
'speech ... uttered by a professional."',6 o This definition crucially distinguishes
professional speech from private speech.
The line between the professional's private speech and professional speech,
then, can be drawn by considering the presence or absence of a professional-
58. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 834.
59. See infra Section III.B.1.
6o. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note i, at 947 (quoting Halberstam, supra note 1, at
843).
61. This distinction is sometimes obscured or disregarded in the case law and literature. See,
e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger 1), 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (ith Cir. 2014)
(denying First Amendment protection "when the professional speaks privately, in the course
of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional's
services"), vacated and superseded on reh'g, 797 F.3 d 859 (iith Cir. 2015), vacated and superseded
on rehg, No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015); Pickup v. Brown (Pickup
II), 74o F. 3 d 1208, 1227 ( 9 th Cir. 2014) (placing professional speech on a continuum and
asserting that "where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, First Amendment
protection is at its greatest"), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014); Jennifer M. Keighley,
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment's Limit on Compelled
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 2347, 2351-52 (2013) (discussing "physician speech" as
a form of private speech of the physician: "[A]lthough physicians' speech to patients during
the course of medical practice, what I will refer to as 'physician speech,' may be regulated
without offending the First Amendment, this does not mean that physicians lose their First
Amendment rights as ordinary citizens against compelled ideological speech." Thus,





client relationship. "Where the personal nexus between professional and client
does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly
acquainted," 62 the speaker is not engaged in professional speech. When the
professional's advice is distributed generally or to the public at large, outside of
the professional-client relationship, it is most likely not professional speech.
Investment advice distributed to the general public, for example, does not
constitute professional speech;6 ' nor do books on how to avoid probate, 65 diet
plans,'6 6  or mushroom guides, 6  even though inaccurate information so
disseminated may be harmful. When professionals speak in such a manner,
they act as ordinary citizens participating in public discourse and accordingly
enjoy ordinary First Amendment protection.
The third element of professional speech- that it is for the purpose of
providing professional advice - constrains what the professional may say in the
context of the professional-client relationship, and so helps distinguish
professional speech from other kinds of speech a professional might engage in,
whether in public or private. It bears emphasis that First Amendment
protection for speech that is not professional advice is unrelated to the
speaker's membership in a knowledge community.68 Although the speaker's
62. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
63. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 851 ("Publication of advice for indiscriminate distribution
generally will defeat a conclusion that the advice was rendered within the professional-client
relationship . . . ."); see also Pickup 1, 728 F.3d at 1054 ("Thus, outside the doctor-patient
relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and pamphleteers,
and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.").
64. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 207-08.
6s. Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights?: Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255,
266-69 (2011) (discussing the litigation culminating in New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Dacey); see also N.Y. Cry. Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967) (holding
that publication of defendant's book, How To Avoid Probate, did not constitute unauthorized
practice of law because it gave "general advice on common problems" rather than "personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person").
66. See Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a publisher was not
liable for a death caused by following a diet book).
67. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9 th Cir. 1991) (holding that a publisher of
a mushroom encyclopedia was not liable for liver damage caused by eating mushrooms).
68. See Keighley, supra note 61, at 2349 n-3 ("Of course, physicians retain the ordinary
protections of the First Amendment when they speak in the public sphere, outside of the
practice of medicine."); cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection ofFree Speech and the Legal
Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 569, 569
(1998) (asserting that "lawyers are sometimes perceived as classic speakers in public
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professional training may inform the content of such speech, she is not
disseminating the knowledge community's insights within a professional-
client relationship for the purpose of providing professional advice. In fact, in
many instances, the speaker may be articulating disagreement with the
knowledge community's consensus, which the professional is not free to do
when providing professional advice. 69
Post, for instance, recounts the "controversy over the safety of dental
amalgams."70 There, a dentist questioned the professional consensus that
dental fillings containing certain substances were safe. Although the dentist no
doubt was informed by his professional background, the expression of his
opinion was entirely private speech.' "Within public discourse," Post explains,
"traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically transmutes claims of
expert knowledge into assertions of opinion."' Any non-dentist's speech
questioning the safety of such fillings would enjoy the same First Amendment
protection, though the public would probably ascribe less persuasive force to a
non-professional's assessment of the matter.7
The same reasoning makes political statements like "vote for Obama," even
if uttered within the context of a professional-client relationship, not
professional speech but the professional's private speech.74 It is not
communicated for the purpose of providing professional advice, and it is likely
not connected to the insights of the knowledge community-even if the
discourse, free of state control and entitled to all the ordinary protections of speech and
association available to other speakers").
6g. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 1, at 848-49.
70. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 947-49; see also HoRWTrz, supra note 13, at
249; POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 12-13.
71. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 43 ("If an expert chooses to participate in public
discourse by speaking about matters within her expertise, her speech will characteristically
be classified as fully protected opinion."); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at
949 ("When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be censored and
suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical
establishment.").
72. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5i, at 44.
73. And professionals' private opinions do not necessarily have to reflect the insights of the
knowledge community. Cf id. ("Biologists can with impunity write editorials in the New
York Times that are such poor science that they would constitute grounds for denying tenure
within a university. Members of the general public can rely on expert pronouncements
within public discourse only at their peril. Such pronouncements are ultimately subject to
political rather than legal accountability."(footnote omitted)).
74. Cf Keighley, supra note 61, at 2350-51 (suggesting that the free speech implications of





knowledge community may have reached a consensus that one candidate for
public office will better serve their interests than another.7s
3. Distinguishing Government Speech
Another important distinction is between professional speech and
government speech. Professional speech must be communicated by a
professional, and professionals can operate in different institutional settings
with varying degrees of government involvement. The professional may be a
government employee, or a government program may fund the professional's
service. Alternatively, the government sometimes seeks to have private
individuals disseminate its own message. Under the government speech
doctrine, "[t] he government alone may determine its message to the exclusion
of all others."76 Just as the state can be anti-smoking or anti-obesity, it may
express a preference on abortion.' Thus, when the state tries to enlist a private
speaker, a key concern is whether the message is attributed to the state or the
professional.
As I have argued elsewhere, effective control over speech should determine
responsibility for the message.' This, in turn, can distinguish government
speech from professional speech, and so mark the boundary up to which the
state can prescribe speech. When, for example, the state demands that
physicians communicate certain claims to their patients in materials of the
physicians' own design, the state effectively tries to obscure authorship even
though it is the state that retains effective control over the message
communicated.so Such speech, then, should be understood as an attempt by
75. If a medical professional makes the statement, it may convey an opinion regarding the
candidate's health policy. See id. at 2350 & n.14.
76. Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REv.
571, 573 (2011).
n. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable
people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other."); id. at 872 ("[T]he
Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from
expressing a preference for normal childbirth." (alteration in original) (quoting Webster v.
Reprod. Health Serys., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)); id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("I agree with the joint opinion that the State may ""expres[s] a
preference for normal childbirth[.]'"'" (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 872)).
78. See Keighley, supra note 61, at 2361.
79. Haupt, supra note 76, at 591-6oo.
so. The concern is that "the government may make puppets out of doctors." Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012).
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the government to co-opt or dictate professional speech. According to the
theory developed here, such prescriptions would constitute inappropriate
regulation of professional speech. But the situation is different where state
regulation permits professionals to disavow the state's message. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the state demanded that a
certain message be communicated,8 ' but the Court's decision suggested that
disclaimers were permissible. The next section more closely examines the
doctrinal status of professional speech in light of Casey and other cases that
concern government speech.
B. Professional Speech in First Amendment Doctrine
Whether a "professional speech doctrine" currently exists is subject to
debate. The Fourth Circuit recently asserted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
recognized the regulation of occupational speech under the 'professional
speech' doctrine at least since Justice Jackson's concurrence in Thomas v.
Collins," a 1945 case. Similarly, some commentators point to Justice White's
concurrence in Lowe v. SEC as declaring the existence of the professional
speech doctrine.8 Others are more skeptical.4
Although the Supreme Court has never identified a category of
"professional speech" for First Amendment purposes, its existence is implicit in
a number of cases.8 s The Court most directly addressed the question of First
Amendment protection for professional speech in the joint opinion in Casey.86
But the concept is embedded in other decisions as well.8 ,
s. See Casey, 505 U.S at 881 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
82. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F. 3 d 560, 568 (4 th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J. concurring)). Relying on Moore-King as well as
Wollschlaeger I, 76o F. 3d 1195, and Pickup I, 728 F. 3 d 1042, the Third Circuit identified
professional speech as "a recognized category of speech." King II, 767 F. 3d at 233.
83. 472 U.S. 181, 211-36 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). For such commentators,
see sources cited in Keighley, supra note 61, at 2368 n.82.
84. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2367-69; Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation
Change Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE
L.J. 1532, 1537, 1552-53 (2014) (calling professional speech "an ill-defined and controversial
area of First Amendment doctrine").
85. Cf Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("Although the Supreme
Court has never held that the physician-patient relationship, as such, receives special First
Amendment protection, its case law assumes, without so deciding, that the relationship is a
protected one.").
86. 505 U.S. at 884 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
87. See, e.g., HORWITz, supra note 13, at 253 (asserting that "[t]he Court in Rust and Velazquez




With Casey-arguably the most on-point treatment-as a starting point,
the doctrinal basis of professional speech appears indeterminate at best. But a
wide-angle view reveals that, despite the initial lack of clarity in Casey, the
Court seems to have at least a hunch that speech communicated by
professionals in a professional-client relationship for the purpose of providing
professional advice is somehow distinctive.
In Casey, the joint opinion addressed the First Amendment in a somewhat
cryptic paragraph:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First Amendment
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of
abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be
sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated . . . but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State . . . . We see no
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide
the information mandated by the State here."
Scholars have been struggling to make sense of this."' Some appellate
courts have arguably taken this obscure statement as license to espouse an
exceedingly narrow view of professional speech.9 o There is now marked and
explicit disagreement among the circuits regarding its proper interpretation. 1
But beyond this puzzling paragraph, Casey hints at the doctrinal status of
professional speech. The joint opinion directly addressed government speech,
compelled speech, and the right to receive information (or not). The
government, as the joint opinion and Justice Stevens's opinion agreed, may
communicate its own preference with respect to abortion.92 Regarding
compelled speech, the joint opinion found that the government may demand,
as part of obtaining the woman's informed consent, that physicians distribute
express it" (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S. 173 (1991) and Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2001))). But see Wells, supra note 30, at 1725 (asserting that the Court in Rust
and Casey failed to consider abortion counseling as speech).
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (citations omitted).
8g. See Halberstam, supra note i, at 773-74, 837-38; Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note
i, at 945-46; Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344-45.
go. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2357 ("Both the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have expanded
Casey's cursory First Amendment discussion into broad holdings that eviscerate physicians'
First Amendment rights within the practice of medicine.").
gi. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 248-49 (4 th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits' interpretation), cert. denied sub nom. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct.
2838 (2015).
g. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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state-drafted materials and make certain statements to their patients that are
"truthful and not misleading."" However, the state neither required that the
providers communicate this information as their own - which could have made
it more difficult for patients to attribute the message to the state-nor
prohibited the providers from expressing their disagreement with the state's
policy. Moreover, there was a provision for physicians to refrain from
providing certain information if they deemed it harmful to their patients."
Finally, with respect to the right to receive information or not, women could
decline to view the materials. 9s
As a matter of existing First Amendment doctrine, then, Casey may be read
as suggesting that while the government is free to express its own opinion, it
may not enlist (potentially unwilling) professionals as mouthpieces to
disseminate its message.96
Also in the abortion context, and pre-dating the Casey decision by a year,
Rust v. Sullivan further illuminates the doctrinal status of professional speech.97
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the issue as concerning "abortion-
related activities,"98 thus apparently avoiding the specific question of
professional speech, 99 that is in fact what the case concerned."oo The Court
noted that "[it] could be argued . . . that traditional relationships such as that
between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First
Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("The physician
or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the availability of printed materials
published by the State . . . " (emphasis added)).
94. Id. at 883-84.
9s. Id. at 881 ("An abortion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that
she has been informed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided
them ifshe chooses to view them." (emphasis added)).
96. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 253 (stating that "the viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly
the state's - not the physician's").
97. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
9s. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added); id. at 194 ("This is not a case of the Government
'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees
from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope." (emphasis added)).
99. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 774.
1o. The Court did conflate professional speech and professional activities, as some
commentators have pointed out. See Wells, supra note 3o, at 1748-49. This conflation is
exemplified by statements such as the following: "But we have here not the case of a general
law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of the
Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from




Government.""o' But it did not resolve the question, suggesting that the
regulations in question "[did] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-
patient relationship."o' The Chief Justice gave the following reasons: first, the
doctor was not compelled "to represent as his own any opinion that he does
not in fact hold;" second, the professional relationship was not "sufficiently all
encompassing" because it "does not provide post-conception medical care" and
consequently, "the doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably
be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider
abortion an appropriate option for her."' Finally, "[t]he doctor [was] always
free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of
the program."lo4
Justice Blackmun's dissent rejected the "direct regulation of dialogue
between a pregnant woman and her physician." 5 In Justice Blackmun's view,
"the regulations impose[d] viewpoint-based restrictions upon protected
speech. ... o Importantly for this discussion, Justice Blackmun framed the
problem of limiting the scope of advice in terms of both the patient's
expectations as well as professional demands. 0 7 Full, comprehensive advice, in
other words, was not only what a pregnant woman expected of her physician -
government-funded or not-but also what the medical profession expected of
its members.
Rust anticipated the points made in Casey with respect to attribution of
speech within government speech doctrine.os Whether or not the Chief Justice
appropriately characterized the extent of the doctor-patient relationship, it is
noteworthy that the Rust Court did acknowledge the possibility of First
Amendment protection in this professional context. Moreover, it is striking
that the Chief Justice suggested drawing an analogy between the doctor-
patient relationship and the treatment of universities under the First
1o1. Rust, 500 U.S. at 2oo.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. "One permissible response to such an inquiry [for referral to an abortion provider] is
that 'the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and
therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion."' Id. at 18o (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 5 9 .8(b) (5)
(1989)).
1os. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 205.
107. See id. at 213-14 ("Indeed, the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical
responsibilities of the medical profession demand no less.").
io8. Though the Court did not expressly analyze Rust under the government speech doctrine,
"when interpreting the holding in later cases, . . . [the Court] explained Rust on this
understanding." Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
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Amendment.o9 This particular institutional analogy likely supports
conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities.
Several decisions concerning legal advice give further doctrinal guidance on
professional speech. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held
unconstitutional a restriction on providing legal advice that "prohibit[ed] legal
representation funded by recipients of [Legal Services Corporation (LSC)]
moneys if the representation involve[d] an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing welfare law.""o As Justice Kennedy explained, "the LSC
program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a
governmental message. Congress funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys to
represent the interests of indigent clients.""' This makes the legal advice
different from government speech- according to Justice Kennedy, "[t]he
lawyer is not the government's speaker""' and the legal advice is a form of
private speech."' Yet the Velazquez Court did recognize that there is a
professional dimension to this speech. The legal system depends on the
traditional role of the attorney,"' which includes "complete analysis of the case,
full advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court.""s Limiting the
range of permissible speech "prohibits speech and expression upon which
courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power."" 6 In light of
these statements, it is evident that the Court understands professional speech
to be distinct from government speech, even when funded by the government.
And, although the Court did not make the point explicitly, it appeared to
recognize the special import of professional speech-at least that of a lawyer-
as distinct from ordinary private speech.
Finally, the two attorney speech cases from 2010, Milavetz v. United States"7
and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,"8 have implications "for those desiring
iog. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
no. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536-37.
i. Id. at 542.
na. Id. Further, Justice Kennedy explained: "The Government has designed this program to use
the legal profession . . . to accomplish its end.. . . The advice from the attorney to the client
and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech
even under a generous understanding of that concept." Id. at 542-43.
113. Id. at 543.
114. Id. at 544 ("Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments
and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the
attorneys . . . .").
us. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 545.
117- 559 U.S. 229 (2010).




advice about any other area of law where Congress may decide to legislate away
the attorney's ability to advise her client and the client's right to receive that
advice.""' Milavetz concerned limitations on attorney speech imposed by the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). 20 The
Act prohibits "debt relief agencies" -which the Court held attorneys to be-
from advising clients "to incur more debt in contemplation of such person
filing" for bankruptcy under the applicable provisions.1' In Milavetz, the Court
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's characterization of the "statute as a broad,
content-based restriction on attorney-client communications that is not
adequately tailored to constrain only speech the Government has a substantial
interest in restricting."" As Justice Sotomayor explained, the phrase "in
contemplation of bankruptcy" indicates abusive conduct.' So understood,
"advice to incur more debt because of bankruptcy ... will generally consist of
advice to 'load up' on debt with the expectation of obtaining its discharge - i.e.,
conduct that is abusive per se."'" Importantly, Justice Sotomayor cited Rule
1.2(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in rejecting the claim
that the BAPCPA provisions prohibit frank discussion between lawyer and
client. 2 s Under the crime-fraud provision, lawyers are not prohibited from
discussing fraudulent or criminal conduct, but they may not advise their clients
to engage in it. In other words, the Court looked to professional standards to
provide guidance on the scope of the Act's prohibition as it concerned
"attorney speech.",,, 6 The Court here demonstrated not only an appreciation
for the type of professional speech that occurs within the lawyer-client
relationship, but also for the role of the professional rules of conduct in
defining the scope of this relationship.
The speech at issue in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,"' by contrast,
occurred outside the boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship; the statute
i19. Knake, supra note 25, at 657.
120. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 231-32. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2oo5, 79 AM. BANKR,. L.J. 571
(2005).
121. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2012)).
122. Id. at 239.
123. Id. at 243.
124. Id. at 244.
125. Id. at 246.
126. Id. at 247 ("Against this backdrop, it is hard to see how a rule that narrowly prohibits an
attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of abusive prefiling conduct
could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client relationship.").
127. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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prohibited the formation of that relationship in the first place.'2 Various
domestic groups and individuals sought to provide information and training to
groups designated as "foreign terrorist organizations" on how to assert their
own legal claims.' 9 The Court upheld the "material support" provision of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act against a First Amendment
challenge.1 3o In dictum, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the decision
does not suggest "that any future applications of the material-support [for
terrorism] statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment
scrutiny."' 3 ' Nonetheless, some commentators assert that the decision "is likely
to have a chilling effect on attorney advice."1 3 2 The Court in this case allegedly
underappreciated the role of attorneys who provide "speech that constitutes
legal 'expert advice or assistance." 3
In sum, all of these decisions hint at the Court's incipient conception of
professional speech. While professional speech is conceptualized as somehow
distinctive, however, the Court lacks the theoretical foundation to properly
evaluate First Amendment protection of such speech.
C. The Commercial Speech Analogy
Courts'3 4 and scholars3 5 have analogized professional speech to commercial
speech. But, I argue, the analogy is tenuous; the underlying speech interests are
fundamentally different. The content of professional speech, distinctively, is
defined by the professional's connection to the knowledge community.
Most prominently perhaps, Halberstam and Post each propose and defend
models that serve as a basis for the analogy. In doing so, however, Halberstam
reconceptualizes commercial speech doctrine itself; Post cautions against its
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also Tarkington, supra note 25, at 24 (noting that the statute
criminalizes the attorney-client relationship).
129. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010).
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Knake, supra note 25, at 656.
133. Tarkington, supra note 25, at 67 (noting that the Court's distinction between speech in
coordination with a Foreign Terrorist Organization and independent speech "is distinctively
and acutely problematic for attorney speech. The attorney's essential role requires speaking
in coordination with and on behalf of clients. Attorneys, when acting as attorneys, do not
speak for themselves or independently").
134. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, z48 (4 th Cit. 2014); King II, 767 F.3d at 233;
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cit. 1984).




wholesale adoption. Halberstam advances the "bounded speech institutions"
model, and Post advances a professional speech variation of the democratic
self-government model. Both focus on the structure of the communication.
The doctrinal starting point for assessing commercial speech remains the
canonical, though increasingly criticized,",6 Central Hudson test." The Court
has ostensibly relied on this doctrinal basis in its expansion of First
Amendment protection for commercial speech.138 Writing at the turn of the
twenty-first century, Halberstam observed that the classic position of minimal
protection of commercial speech was beginning to appear in flux."' Since then,
there has indeed been a considerable expansion of First Amendment protection
for commercial speech. The Court now affords what comes close to strict
scrutiny review in commercial speech cases.'o
But the extent of protection should not be the primary reason to analogize
the two types of speech unless doctrine is tethered to theory. This requires "a
deeper kinship between the two forms of communication.""' For Halberstam,
this deeper kinship is rooted in the "paradigm of bounded speech
institutions."" Both professional and commercial speech in this model can be
seen as "relational" or "bounded speech institutions," though Halberstam
acknowledges that "the relationship between physician and patient and the
duties attendant to that relationship are substantially deeper than those
136. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5
(2000) [hereinafter Post, Commercial Speech] (contending that Central Hudson itself is
indeterminate and therefore provides an insufficient constitutional basis for resolving
questions of commercial speech protection).
137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("In
commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.").
The First Amendment was originally inapplicable to "purely commercial advertising."
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The modern category of "commercial
speech" was first identified in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
138. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 787-89; Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 42.
139. Halberstam, supra note i, at 776-77.
140. Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 42.
141. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 776.
142. Id. at 778.
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between vendor and purchaser."" He makes an (ostensibly descriptive)
institutional or structural argument, suggesting that
the Court may be seen as implementing a constitutional theory of
bounded speech institutions, based on its perception of various socially
defined relationships between interlocutors and, accordingly, rendering
contextual judgments about the extent of government intervention that
is both necessary for and compatible with the preservation of the
particular institution.'
With respect to both professional and commercial speech "[t]he boundaries of
the discourse . . . may be policed, but, conversely, as long as the speaker
remains within the boundary of the institution, the speaker would be engaged
in protected speech.""s In other words, state regulation serves a definitional
purpose -mapping the boundaries of discourse. While speakers remain within
those bounds, interference with their speech is impermissible."' The so-
bounded communicative relationships are subject to "contextual First
Amendment review that is specifically centered around the social relation, as
opposed to an abstract review such as that traditionally applied to the street-
corner speaker.""' Under this model, in both the professional and the
commercial speech contexts, "[t]he government may neither suppress the
speech entirely nor remodel the institution to its liking." 8
Conceptually, it seems plausible to view both commercial and professional
speech in this way. But, while I agree with the differentiation between speech
within and outside of a bounded discourse and with awarding First
Amendment protection accordingly, I do not embrace the suggested parallel
between commercial and professional speech. The "bounded speech
143. Id. at 851. "Indeed, as compared to commercial speech, we might even expect the deeper
relationship between physician and patient to lead, at least in some cases, to protection
beyond that afforded to commercial speech." Id. at 838.
144. Id. at 778.
145. Id. at 857.
146. Id. at 828 ("On the one hand, the Court welcomes government regulation as partially
constitutive of the communicative interaction, that is, as assuring that communications that
are dependent on predefined communicative goals remain within the boundaries of that
discourse. On the other hand, the Court rejects government prescriptions as
unconstitutional when they infringe on the integrity of an established framework for
discourse.").
147. Id. at 834. This is true "whether the relationships are ones of trust, such as those between
lawyer and client or doctor and patient, or are merely common material enterprises, such as
those between buyers and sellers." Id.
148. Id. at 862.
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institutions" model assumes the equal position of professional and commercial
speech in contrast to political or private speech, which is traditionally
unbounded."' However, it does not sufficiently account for the differences
between professional and commercial speech. In order to do so, such a
structural view is not enough.' The bounded discourse approach
encompasses the individual professional-client relationship, but, in doing so,
undervalues the role of the professional's connection to the knowledge
community. In terms of content, the individual professional serves as a conduit
for the knowledge community's insights.
The content of the communication and its relation to the body of
knowledge possessed by a knowledge community is distinctive in the
professional speech context. So is the imposition of professional malpractice
liability and its relation to the professional standard of care. This unique
relationship with the knowledge community demands a thicker account of the
communication. Thus, the analogy falls short if it is based solely on the
structural "bounded speech institutions" model. It explains why the state may
impose liability as a structural boundary, but it does not define the content of
the boundedness. This makes Halberstam's model conceptually useful, but
ultimately incomplete. To establish a theoretical basis for evaluating
professional speech, this model should be supplemented with the theory of
knowledge communities.
Post, in setting up the commercial speech-professional speech analogy,
focuses on three distinctive features of commercial speech: first, the concern
about the flow of information to the public; second, the value attached only to
truthful, non-misleading information (and, consequently, the application of
content- and viewpoint-based regulations); and third, the permissibility of
disclosure requirements based on the emphasis on the public's right to receive
truthful and non-misleading information.' These three features, in Post's
149. Id. at 832.
iso. Halberstam concedes as much, for at least some situations, pointing out that while "it is the
relationship that defines the discourse within which both speakers and listeners have rights
under the First Amendment," id. at 851, the "deeper relationship" between, for example, a
physician and patient may "lead, at least in some cases, to protection beyond that afforded to
commercial speech," id. at 838. The structural view also seems problematic on its own terms
in defining the boundedness of commercial speech itself. See id. at 852 ("With regard to the
regulation of commercial speech, the question of what is considered part of the bounded
discourse is more difficult to answer, because we cannot rely on the relatively clear
consideration of whether the speaker is reasonably understood by the interlocutors as
applying considered judgment to the listener's particular circumstances for the benefit of the
listener. To the contrary, most commercial speech today occurs in the impersonal realm of
mass communication.").
151. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note i, at 975.
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assessment, closely track the concerns in the professional speech context. In
contrast to speech as part of public discourse, the focus of commercial speech,
like that of professional speech, is its informational value."' The knowledge-
enhancing character of both types of speech provides the link to the democratic
self-government values underlying the First Amendment.'"s
However, Post offers two distinctions between commercial speech and
professional speech, which complicates the analogy. 4 The first concerns
dissemination of commercial information to the public at large as opposed to
the dissemination of professional information only to the client. In an age of
sophisticated, highly personalized advertising, however, this characterization of
the dissemination of commercial speech may no longer be descriptively
accurate." The second distinction lies in the presupposed equality of the
speaker and the listener in commercial speech and their relative inequality in
professional speech. Of course, extensive psychological research on the part of
advertisers makes the speaker and the listener unequal in the commercial
speech context as well. Product placement, subconscious messaging, and the
like give a distinct advantage to commercial speakers over their audiences. The
Court may have originally had it right in assuming the vulnerability of
consumers, though not because the consumer "lacks sophistication,"s' but
because the advertiser has an overabundance of it.s' Thus, Post rightly
cautions against pushing the analogy. s8
The commercial speech analogy, then, while initially appealing, falls short.
It lacks descriptive accuracy and analytical force on numerous counts. A
preferable approach, therefore, considers the theoretical justifications for
protecting professional speech on its own merits.
152. PosT, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 41; Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 4
("Commercial speech ... consists of communication about commercial matters that conveys
information necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of
public discourse."); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note i, at 974-75.
153. See infra Section II.C.
154. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 46-47.
155. See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
156. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
383 (1977)).
157. Cf Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 41 (speaking of the inability of the Court "to
transcend older images of consumers as vulnerable and reliant, images that underlay the
Court's earlier refusal to extend any First Amendment protection to commercial speech").
158. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 980 ("The analogy to commercial speech
should not be pressed too far. Commercial speech has its own tormented doctrinal history,
with far too many confusions and imprecisions. It would be disheartening to see these




II. THEORIZING PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
Conceptualizing the learned professions as knowledge communities allows
us to rethink professional speech in light of the traditional theoretical
justifications for First Amendment protection. Professional speech as a
distinctive form of speech is worthy of First Amendment protection. Situating
professional speech within the standard theoretical accounts illustrates the
unique ways in which this type of speech intersects with the underlying
interests. While some scholars have emphasized the democratic self-
government justification for protecting professional speech,"' this Part
suggests that other First Amendment theories, based on autonomy interests
and the marketplace of ideas, also justify-in a way distinct from other speech
contexts - First Amendment protection for professional speech. Without taking
a position on which of these traditional theories best justifies First Amendment
protection,16 o and without ascribing any particular ranking to them, 6 , I
suggest that professional speech interests sound in all standard theories.
With respect to autonomy interests, the role of the professions as
knowledge communities reframes the importance of professional autonomy.
Although the emphasis is traditionally on the listener when the informational
value of the communication is at issue, the speaker's autonomy interests are
implicated as well. Likewise, the knowledge community idea reframes the
application of the marketplace theory. The individual professional, under this
view, is closely connected to the marketplace of ideas that may be found within
the discourse of the profession. Finally, with respect to democratic self-
government, the knowledge community concept influences the application of
that theory of First Amendment protection for speech. Its effect can be seen in
two directions. First, it explains how the individual client can benefit from
professional advice directly and how the knowledge basis of the entire
community can be enhanced by the individual professional's communication of
the knowledge community's insights to one client. Second, by providing a
close link between the individual professional and the knowledge community,
isg. Id. at 974 (suggesting that "the single most useful theory of First Amendment value is the
concept of democratic self-governance"). Other commentators have followed Post in this
assessment. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 25, at 674-75 (dismissing marketplace and autonomy
justifications).
16o. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 119-20 (suggesting that there is not one exclusive approach
to justifying First Amendment protection).
161. But see Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2373 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine]
(suggesting a "lexical priority" among First Amendment theories that places the
participatory democracy theory at the top).
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it brings together the individual focus of those who favor a participatory
perspective of democratic self-government with those who would focus on the
role of the collective.
A. Autonomy Interests
The autonomy interests implicated by professional speech are somewhat
distinct from other speech contexts.'6 ' I will call "decisional autonomy
interests" the interests of the listener who needs the information to make an
informed decision. 6 4 Decisional autonomy in the professional speech context is
very different from the commercial speech context. While commercial speech
targets the autonomy of the listener to make commercial choices - thereby
contributing to the ability to make independent decisions-the target of
professional speech is much more closely connected to the self, at times
concerning the physical or psychological integrity of the listener's own person.
Moreover, the speaker pays for the speech in the commercial speech context
(though, of course, the goal of commercial speech is often to persuade the
consumer to buy a product or service) whereas it is the listener who pays for the
speech in the professional speech context, indicating that the economic
interests do not align. In professional speech, by contrast with commercial
speech, payment for services is secondary to the knowledge-based nature of the
service provided. 6 s
The other autonomy interests are those of the speakers, which I will call
"professional autonomy interests." The qualifier "professional" signals that it is
162. See id. at 2368-69 (distinguishing "Meiklejohnian and participatory perspectives").
According to Post, "the Meiklejohnian approach interprets the First Amendment primarily
as a shield against the 'mutilation of the thinking process of the community,' whereas the
participatory approach understands the First Amendment instead as safeguarding the ability
of individual citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion." Id. at 2368 (citation
omitted).
163. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964 (1978) (describing individuals' autonomy interests as a theoretical justification for
unrestricted speech); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (arguing for the persuasion principle in freedom of expression).
164. The Court's failure to consider the patient's interest in receiving information has been
criticized in the reproductive rights context. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 219-20.
165. Cf Halberstam, supra note 1, at 838 (discussing the distinct interests at stake in the
commercial and professional speech contexts); Knake, supra note 25, at 690 (recounting that
payment may not be decisive in determining the interests at stake in professional speech
contexts). This is true in commercial speech cases as well. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (stating that "speech does not




not so much the autonomy interest to freely express one's personal opinions -
as is the case in free speech theory concerning public discourse -but rather to
communicate insights of the knowledge community as a member of the
profession.
1. Decisional Autonomy Interests
The professional relationship is typically characterized by an asymmetry of
knowledge. Clients seek professionals' advice precisely because of this
asymmetry. "Clients are presumed to be dependent upon professional
judgment and unable themselves independently to evaluate its quality."' ' This
is not unique to the learned professions. As Kathleen Sullivan has pointed out,
"Lawyers know far more about law than their clients, but information
asymmetry creates moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about the gravity
of a problem) for auto mechanics as well."' 6 These hazards are exacerbated
when the client's personal health or freedom or significant financial interests
are at stake. Thus, "the government may properly try to shield the client from
the professional's incompetence or abuse of trust.",68
The listener's interests are only served if the professional communicates
information that is accurate (under the knowledge community's current
assessment), reliable, and personally tailored to the specific situation of the
listener. The client's agency requires that the ultimate decision rest with her.
The nature of the professional-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary
duties.169 To bridge the knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the
client's decisional autonomy interests, the professional has to communicate all
information necessary to make an informed decision to the client.
Thus, the interest in full disclosure is linked to the autonomy interests of
those seeking the advice of professionals. To the extent that this is facilitated by
an informed consent requirement, as in the medical context, the potential for
corruption of the information by outside interference is particularly
troublesome. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his opinion in Casey,
"Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's
66. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 47; see also, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780
(D.C. Cit. 1972) ("The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts,
and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to
reach an intelligent decision.").
167. Sullivan, supra note 68, at 580.
168. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344.
169. See Halberstam, supra note i, at 845; Keighley, supra note 61, at 2374.
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most personal deliberations its own views of what is best."170 But while this
concern is perhaps most obvious in cases involving bodily integrity,"' other
forms of professional advice should be equally uncorrupted for the same
reason. Concerns regarding the agency of the listener obtain in all professional
speech contexts.
2. Professional Autonomy Interests
To the extent autonomy interests matter in professional speech, the focus
tends to be on the listener's interests."' But the speaker's autonomy interests
are also at stake. Some commentators fall back solely on the professional's
personal autonomy interests.'73 Professionals as individuals of course have a
First Amendment right to speak their own mind in public discourse, perhaps
even challenging the knowledge community's insights." But this is not a
primary concern in the professional speech context. Quite to the contrary, there
is an expectation within the professional-client relationship that the
professional does not challenge the knowledge community's insights in
dispensing professional advice."'
The professional not only speaks for herself, but also as a member of a
learned profession-that is, the knowledge community. And that community
has an interest of its own. Only if the community remains autonomous can it
develop and refine the specialized knowledge that is its essence and the source
of its social value. The professional speaker has a unique autonomy interest in
communicating her message according to the standards of the profession to
170. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
171. It is also arguably recognized-at least implicitly-as a matter of existing doctrine. "The
Rust majority's recognition, at least in principle, of the protected status of physician-patient
communications, comports with the Court's judgment elsewhere in the legal and medical
contexts that professionals play a special role in assisting individuals in the exercise of
personal autonomy in the vindication of basic rights." Halberstam, supra note 1, at 775.
172. See, e.g., Keighley, supra note 61, at 24o5. But see Halberstam, supra note 1, at 844 ("As in the
case of commercial speech, the focus on the listener in professional speech would again be,
strictly speaking, misplaced, because a professional's interest in communicating to a client
should be constitutionally relevant.").
173. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2373 ("While physicians may have more limited autonomy
interests when engaging in the practice of medicine, this does not mean that they surrender
all of their ordinary First Amendment rights against compelled ideological speech.
Physicians retain the core First Amendment right of ordinary citizens to refuse to be the
mouthpiece for the state's ideological advocacy." (emphasis added)).
174. See supra Section I.A.2.




which she belongs, precisely in order to uphold the integrity of its knowledge
community. Physicians, for instance, should not be compelled to speak in a
way that undermines their profession's scientific insights.
This goes beyond the structural interest in protecting the "bounded speech
institutions.",1, 6 It also concerns the content of the communication. While some
commentators assert that the professional's autonomy interests guard against
compelled speech "on matters of religion, politics, and values,"'" the
professional autonomy interests reach much further. Corrupting the content of
a communication to a client within the professional-client relationship
fundamentally concerns the professional autonomy interests of the
professional. This is an interest that goes to the identity of the professional as a
member of a profession,",8 rather than the professional's individual autonomy
interest, which is entirely unrelated to her professional role. Conceptualizing
the professional as a member of a knowledge community brings the autonomy
interest in articulating the uncorrupted insights of the knowledge community
into focus.
B. Marketplace Interests
In the realm of professional speech, the classic Holmesian notion of a "free
trade in ideas" 9 would seem to have little purchase. so While "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market,"'8 ' the professional does not seek to subject her professional opinion to
this test when speaking within the confines of the professional-client
176. See supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text; cf Halberstam, supra note i, at 848 ("The
First Amendment protects not the individual listener's subjective desire for information, but
the practice of the profession."); id. at 867 ("The First Amendment protects the doctor-
patient dialogue as an important forum for the exercise of individual autonomy through the
communication of knowledge that is generally free from government control. At the same
time, however, the First Amendment allows for state regulation of the physician's
statements in order to ensure the integrity of the communicative institution.").
177. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2376.
178. Cf Knake, supra note 25, at 678 (noting that in the narrower context of attorney speech,
"[a]n attorney's identity as a member of the legal profession also holds First Amendment
significance").
179. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
iso. Cf PosT, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5i, at xii ("Contemporary technical expertise is created by
practices that demand both critical freedom to inquire and affirmative disciplinary virtues of
methodological care . . . . The maintenance of these virtues quite contradicts the egalitarian
tolerance that defines the marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment.").
181. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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relationship.'8 The pragmatic dimension of the market metaphor does not
apply: experience and truth in the current assessment of the knowledge
community are quite obviously located with the professional, making it
inapposite "to capture the idea that truth must be experimentally determined
from the properties of experience itself."' 8  Indeed, the state may ensure that
clients seeking professional advice are not harmed by "false" ideas by way of
imposing professional malpractice liability.'" Thus, the classic marketplace
paradigm is inapplicable to professional speech within the professional-client
relationship.
Nonetheless, there is another facet to the idea of the marketplace theory as
applied to professional speech.'8s Although scholars have observed that
professional speech is distinct from other speech, "which generally treats the
truth as just 'another opinion,""8 6 the details remain underexplored. As Paul
Horwitz has put it, in the professional speech context, "expertise based on a
body of specialized knowledge is the very basis of the value and legitimacy of
the speech."'8 ' It is here that the considerations underlying professional speech
intersect with those underlying scientific and academic speech. 8 8
182. See, e.g., Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2366 ("It makes no sense,
for example, to locate a 'truth-seeking function' in the speech between lawyers or doctors
and their clients . . ..
183. Id. at 2360.
184. Id. at 2364. See infra Part III.
iss. The issues addressed here are, however, discussed in the First Amendment literature
concerned with scientific and academic speech. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 136
("There is also wide agreement that advancement in understanding among persons capable
of assessing scientific claims is promoted by freedom of communication within the scientific
community, that government intervention to suppress some scientific ideas in favor of
others would not promote scientific truth."); Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra
note 161, at 2365 ("The social practices necessary for a marketplace of ideas to serve a 'truth-
seeking function' are perhaps most explicitly embodied in the culture of scholarship
inculcated in universities and professional academic disciplines."). Indeed, some suggest
that the marketplace metaphor itself originally was influenced by Justice Holmes's readings
on "the method of science." See Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2365
& n.43 ("It is likely that Holmes was exposed to [CHARLES S. PEIRCE, The Fixation ofBelief
in VALUES IN A UNIvERSE OF CHANCE 91, ito-i (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1958)] while he was a
member of the Metaphysical Club.").
186. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 248 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY: ESSAYS
IN POLITICAL THEORY 19 (2007)); see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking
down the Stolen Valor Act).
187. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 248; see also POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 8 ("We rely on
expert 'knowledge' precisely because it has been vetted and reviewed by those whose
judgment we have reason to trust. All living disciplines are institutional systems for the
production of such 'knowledge.'").




There exists a marketplace of ideas internal to each profession. The issue
here is the formation of professional knowledge (rather than, as we saw with
the autonomy justification, its dissemination). Within the discourse of the
profession, the acceptance of professional insights will depend on the rules
established by the profession. Scientific insights, for example, will be subjected
to peer review and hypotheses will be subjected to the test of falsification.'"
These internal processes serve a purpose akin to that of the Holmesian
marketplace of ideas. But, to the extent that such a marketplace of ideas exists
as what we might call an epistemic marketplace, and that professional
standards are generated by testing insights on that marketplace,
nonprofessionals do not participate in it. The current state of the art provides
the foundation of the professional's advice (though current debates within the
field may influence what counts as a defensible professional position). 90 As
knowledge communities, then, the professions should be awarded deference.
As Post notes, the marketplace theory "requires the protection only of
speech that communicates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social
practices that produce truth."' It is the professional's connection to the
knowledge community that makes the marketplace theory relevant. If the
account offered here is an accurate portrayal of the formation of professional
knowledge within the knowledge community, the step from the community to
the individual professional follows straightforwardly. In reciprocal fashion, the
individual professional's interest lies in preserving the integrity of the
knowledge community's insights, just as the knowledge community's interest
lies in having the individual professional communicate its insights correctly.
While this complements the professional autonomy interests, as just
described,'92 the focus of this theory is on preserving the integrity of the search
for truth-that is, the formation of professional knowledge-within the
discourse of the knowledge community.
189. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). For similar
observations from the legal academy, see POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 8
("Scholarship requires not only a commitment to vigorous debate and critical freedom, but
also and equally a commitment to enforcing standards of judgment and critical rigor.").
190. Cf POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 67 ("In contrast to the marketplace of ideas,
therefore, academic freedom protects scholarly speech only when it complies with
'professional norms."'). In the context of professional liability, the tort regime accounts for
the range of valid opinions with "multiple schools of thought" or "respectable minority"
rules. See infra Section III.B.
191. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2366 (contending further that
"[e]xactly where the theory could appropriately be applied ... would be highly debatable"
and, in his assessment, "the scope of its application would be quite narrow").
192. See supra Section II.A.
1275
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
C. Democratic Self-Government Interests
Focusing on the informational value of professional speech, the democratic
self-government theory would find such speech worthy of First Amendment
protection because it "cognitively empowers public opinion" and thus "serves
the value of democratic competence."' (This idea is also reflected in the
commercial speech analogy, as discussed earlier.)'9 4 But the democratic self-
government value of professional speech might be greater still. Professionals
supply information to clients that not only concerns the clients' own lives but
may also "require collective action to change rights and responsibilities in
society."' For example, courts9's and scholars"' have emphasized the role of
lawyers in democratic self-government. Other professionals, too, may
contribute to expanding the knowledge base upon which citizens can make
informed decisions.
Yet the democratic self-government theory builds on some debatable
assumptions. It may seem questionable whether a client or patient would, in
fact, be primarily concerned with the policy implications of the professional
advice she receives. Is the lawyer's client really thinking about broad questions
of access to justice? Is the physician's patient really thinking about health
policy? Or are both primarily concerned with having their individual problems
solved? While these questions are sometimes acknowledged in the literature,
the abstract possibility of taking political action based on the individualized
professional advice received appears sufficient to justify applying the theory to
professional speech. 98
Within the theory of democratic self-government, two distinct strands
arguably stand in opposition to each other: one emphasizes the "safeguarding
of collective processes"; the other emphasizes individual rights.!99
193. PosT, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 40-41 (making this observation with respect to
commercial speech).
194. See supra Section I.C.
195. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 812.
196. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977) ("[L]awyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been
'officers of the courts."' (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975))).
197. Halberstam, supra note i, at 812 ("Indeed some professionals, such as attorneys, take an
active part in assisting in the vindication of existing legal and constitutional rights in courts
and other government fora.").
198. See, e.g., id. at 813; Keighley, supra note 61, at 2371-72; Knake, supra note 25, at 676.
199. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2367 (discussing the Meiklejohnian
theory and the participatory self-government theory). Post argues that the Meiklejohnian




Conceptualizing individual professionals as part of the larger knowledge
community-as conduits communicating the knowledge community's
insights, and thus as trustees for the speech of others -reconciles the two
democratic self-government approaches in the professional speech context. The
close connection between the individual professional and the knowledge
community links the individual role of the professional and the collective role
of the knowledge community to which the professional belongs.
As this Part has demonstrated, the traditional theoretical justifications for
First Amendment protection apply to professional speech in a unique way. All
standard theories suggest that professional speech deserves robust First
Amendment protection.
III. LIMITING PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
This Part considers the appropriate limits on professional speech. The state
may regulate the professions, but "[b]eing a member of a regulated profession
does not . . . result in a surrender of First Amendment rights."2 And as
Eugene Volokh has noted, "it's far from clear that the government should be
completely free to regulate professionals' speech to their clients."" Therefore,
it is worth unpacking what state regulation of the professions means and
determining when such regulation directly and impermissibly affects
professional speech.
Section III.A briefly considers the history of regulating the learned
professions. Initially self-regulating, the professions developed a set of norms
that solidified over time. State involvement in professional regulation followed.
Turning to three typical kinds of regulations -namely concerning advertising,
access to the profession, and unauthorized practice-I will demonstrate that
professional speech concerns do not ordinarily arise in these contexts. These
types of regulations do not generally concern the body of professional
knowledge that forms the repository for individual professionals' advice to
clients and its subsequent communication. Thus, while these types of
Id. at 2369. Nonetheless, as Post points out, there are certain contexts-such as federal
regulation of the broadcast media-that build on the Meiklejohnian theory. There, the
specific role of the "broadcast licensees as trustees for the speech of others" allowed an
approach that Post deems "compatible with the participatory approach." Id. at 2370.
2oo. Conant v. Walters, 309 F-3d 629, 637 (9th Cit. 2002).
201. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344-
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regulations may have far-reaching consequences, they do not implicate
professional speech interests as defined here." This makes the importance of
distinguishing between regulation of the profession and regulation of
professional speech palpable.
Section III.B then turns to the interplay between the First Amendment and
tort liability for professional malpractice. The tort regime in this context
functions as a form of regulation." The imposition of malpractice liability has
never been found to offend the First Amendment. But the conventional answer
as to why that is so is unsatisfactory. Stated in an oversimplified way, the
argument is that the state may regulate the professions, and the permissibility
of regulation is incompatible with the First Amendment. 4
There is an expansive body of literature on professional malpractice law -
its effects on professionals and clients, larger policy implications, and possible
need for reform. All of this is well beyond the scope of this discussion. My
point here is relatively narrow and conceptual. Professionals may be held liable
for "unprofessional" speech-that is, speech within the professional-client
202. There are other forms of regulation that may apply to the speech of professionals. Perhaps
the most apparent, in the legal realm, are rules of procedure. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of
Nev., So U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) ("It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a
judicial proceeding, whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely
circumscribed."); see also Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49
ARK. L. REv. 687 (1997); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 569 ("Rules of evidence and procedure,
bans on revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous
pleadings, to name a few, are examples of speech limitations widely accepted as functional
necessities in the administration of justice . . . ."); Wendel, supra note 25, at 348, 381-82.
Agreeing to the many restrictions on attorney speech is simply accepted and explained as "a
condition of being admitted into the bar." Tarkington, supra note 25, at 31. These
restrictions limit a wide swath of what should be protected professional speech. Perhaps a
better explanation is that these kinds of rules seem closely related to the types of time, place,
and manner restrictions permissible in public discourse as well. But these limits on speech
do not give rise to professional speech concerns in the strict sense. The speech so
constrained does not communicate the knowledge community's insights, within the
professional-client relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice. Hence
they fall outside the scope of this discussion.
203. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court's Theory of Private Law, 62
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1118 (2013) (" [V]irtually all commentators assume that private law is a form
of public regulation."). See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi
ed., 2002).
204. See, e.g., King 1, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 319 ("[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the
argument that professional counseling is speech], because taken to its logical end, it would
mean that any regulation of professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First
Amendment free speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened scrutiny
to be permissible. Such a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state
generally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing
medicine and mental health services.").
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relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice, that fails
accurately to communicate the knowledge community's insights.
The liability scheme thus draws on the same body of professional
knowledge that I have argued deserves First Amendment protection. If liability
is appropriately allocated against this benchmark, the liability scheme
normatively supports - rather than undermines - protection of professional
speech. In order to achieve fair results under this scheme, professionals may be
held liable only under a standard that is exclusively determined by the
profession. It follows that the knowledge community's insights and their
communication to the client by the individual professional must remain
uncorrupted.
A. Regulation of the Professions
State regulation of the professions is not incompatible with protecting
professional speech. Maintaining a focus on the role of knowledge
communities, this section outlines the extent of permissible regulation of the
professions in light of its history. The historical perspective illuminates the
nexus between licensing, state power, and regulation of professions and
professionals. There is a long history of self-regulation of knowledge
communities.2 Traditionally, certain professions themselves created barriers
to entry into the profession, policed membership, and established a distinct
professional "culture." This culture then solidified into a set of professional
norms, enforced by professional bodies overseeing the standards of entry and
membership. The state assumed some of these functions over time, either
taking on the role of regulator directly or through its interaction with
professional associations.o Licensing requirements for law and medicine in
the United States likely date back to the founding period,o" although there was
205. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 15 10-11 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013). See generally
BRUNDAGE, supra note 35; KRAUSE, supra note 35; William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of
Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV.
485 (s995); Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History ofRegulation,
48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1998).
206. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1172-75 (describing efforts of the American Medical
Association to lobby state legislatures regarding licensing laws in the mid-nineteenth
century and its later involvement in setting licensing standards); David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lauyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1992).
207. Douglas A. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 46, 46 n.1 (1972) ("The licensing of lawyers and doctors in this country began
in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth.").
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a noticeable retreat from licensing in the Jacksonian era."8 The relationship
between the regulated professions and the regulating state generally
remained one of collaboration; in the case of licensing, for instance, state
involvement was overwhelmingly welcomed-even "eagerly sought"" 9 -by
the professions.1 o
There are now numerous ways in which the state regulates the professions.
For example, " [t]he medical and legal professions . . . have long been subject to
licensing and supervision by the State 'for the protection of society,' and the
Court has indicated that such regulations would be upheld if they 'have a
rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice' the
profession."" I will consider briefly three prototypical areas of state regulation
of the professions: advertising, access to the profession, and unauthorized
practice. None of them, as the following discussion demonstrates, directly
address the types of professional speech issues with which I am concerned.
Therefore, they do not constitute "limits on professional speech" in the strict
sense of the term. The takeaway is simple, but important: protecting
professional speech does not make state regulation of the professions
impossible.
One prominent context in which professional regulation as a matter of free
speech has been litigated in the past has been advertising.1 2 In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court has dealt with questions of advertising and solicitation
regulations for professional services, such as legal services," accounting
208. Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1171-72.
zog. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 11.
210. Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1172-73.
211. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 834 (first quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122
(1889); then quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)); see also King
II, 767 F.3d at 229 ("The authority of the States to regulate the practice of certain professions
is deeply rooted in our nation's jurisprudence. Over loo years ago, the Supreme Court
deemed it 'too well settled to require discussion' that 'the police power of the states extends
to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the
public health.'" (quoting Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (19o) and citing Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889))).
212. See Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 572-76; Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lauyer Advertising
and Solicitation Rules under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q- 487 (1986); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lauyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 574-
80.
213. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (holding that a ban on lawyer direct
mailing to victims for thirty days after an accident or disaster was permissible); Peel v. Att'y
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that a ban on advertising
lawyer specialist certification was unconstitutional); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466




services," and dental"s or medical services.' The gist of these decisions is
that professional advertising is largely - though not uniformly"' - protected as
a matter of commercial speech." Advertising for professional services is
commercial speech, and "[c]onstitutional protection for attorney advertising,
and for commercial speech generally, is of recent vintage.""
Historically, professional ethics prohibited advertising, and courts
consistently deferred to professional ethics in upholding advertising
restrictions. As Walter Gellhom noted in the mid-1970s, "[t]he unethicality of
advertising has long been an article of faith among professionals, and the
courts have generally shared this faith."22 This deference to professional
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that a ban on print ads
targeting victims was permissible); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(holding that the regulation of lawyer in-person solicitation was permissible); Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that the prohibition of newspaper ads for routine
legal services was unconstitutional).
214. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1994) (holding that a
censure for using the truthful designations "CPA" and "CFP" was unconstitutional);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (holding that a ban on in-person solicitation by
the CPA was unconstitutional).
215. Semler v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 613 (1935) (holding that a statute
regulating certain forms of advertising by dentists was permissible).
216. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (holding that the application of a statute
forbidding "encourag[ing] or promot[ing]" an abortion to medical advertising was
unconstitutional).
217. See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 580-84 (noting the disparate treatment of lawyer
advertising-where "the Court gives greater deference to state interests" in upholding
regulations -from that of other professionals). Sullivan criticizes this distinction between
lawyers and other professionals, finding it "hardly clear that broad assumptions about
public regard for the legal profession- especially if only weakly empirically demonstrated-
ought to provide the basis for limiting lawyer promotional practices that cannot be shown to
cause clients demonstrable material harm." Id. at 588. Instead, she concludes, "[t]he
question . . . is whether lawyer-specific speech regulations are really needed . .. or whether
problems of fraud, misrepresentation, and overreaching may be adequately controlled by
generally applicable background consumer protection laws . . . ." Id.
218. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 575.
219. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995).
220. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 21 n.53. Gellhorn further points out that not until 1976 did the
ABA permit "a lawyer ... to indicate 'in dignified form' in professional announcements and
in the yellow pages of telephone directories his preferred areas of practice and his
educational background." Id. at 21. See also Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REV. 702, 712-16 (1977) (discussing the ABA House of
Delegates 1976 amendment permitting this type of advertising). Morgan noted in response
to the 1976 amendment to the ABA rules on lawyer advertising that the changes "make
information more accessible than before, but they perpetuate many barriers to
information- barriers which are of no benefit to anyone but attorneys." Id. at 716.
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norms was long-standing. Chief Justice Hughes, in a 1935 case involving
dentists' advertising, stated: "What is generally called the 'ethics' of the
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such
standards.""
But, as Kathleen Sullivan observed, "[t]he decisions upholding professional
ethics regulations against First Amendment challenges are difficult to square
with the Court's other advertising decisions."" And Chief Justice Hughes's
statement-that professional ethics are part of the profession's expert
opinion -goes too far. No specialized knowledge is needed for the question of
whether advertising for professional services is appropriate; it is a purely
economic question. As a matter of institutional competence, courts can rely on
their own expertise in economic matters.2 3
This helps us understand why courts have turned away from their earlier
deference to professional norms prohibiting advertising and why, in embracing
commercial speech protection for advertising against professionals' wishes,
they have nevertheless begun to regulate professional speech. On matters of
regulation that do not directly concern the specialized knowledge of knowledge
communities that constitutes the basis for professional advice, professional
speech protection should not require broad deference to the profession. The
professional advertising her services is not speaking as part of the knowledge
community to transmit advice to a client. She speaks only as a private
commercial actor. Professional advertising, like commercial advertising, thus is
properly reviewed as a matter of commercial speech.'
Beyond advertising, the state may determine educational and other fitness
standards for the profession. Imposing limits on access to a profession by
establishing educational standards or licensing and certification requirements
does not affect professional speech directly. To be sure, there is a long-
recognized tension between restricting access to ensure competent advice and
restricting access in order to limit competition.2' And there certainly is
potential for abuse.2 6 "On the one side is the need to preserve the integrity of
221. Semler v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935).
222. Sullivan, supra note 68, at 578.
223. Cf Stein, supra note 22, at 1245 (discussing in the medical malpractice context the
competence of courts and their impartiality as compared to the professions in decisions
concerning economic considerations and social welfare).
224. This is true conceptually irrespective of the Court's doctrinal approach to commercial
speech, which may well be flawed. See supra notes 136-14o and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 31.
226. See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (discussing citizenship and residency requirements); id. at 18




professional knowledge; on the other side is the fact that professional
knowledge sometimes reflects sociological prerogatives of class and power that
should be disciplined by democratic political purposes.""' Indeed, some have
pointed out that "there is a large body of historical, economic, and sociological
literature that suggests that the primary motivation for professional licensing
laws is economic self-interest." 8 Without taking a position on the extent of
self-interest in professional licensing, it seems relatively unproblematic from a
First Amendment perspective to permit some form of access control.' 9
Sometimes, First Amendment problems can arise if access to the profession
is denied because of the content of an applicant's speech. One prominent
example is the case of George Anastaplo, whose bar application was denied by
the Illinois Bar due to his refusal to answer questions regarding his views on
the Communist party.23o (He famously argued his own case before the
Supreme Court, lost in a 5-4 decision, and became a law professor instead.) 31
But the types of First Amendment problems arising here are different from
those in the professional speech context. Here, it is not the knowledge
community's specialized knowledge that the state interferes with but rather the
individual professional's opinion." Thus, an appropriate shield against such
restrictions may be found in the professional's individual First Amendment
rights.
Finally, unauthorized practice regulations raise issues similar to regulations
concerning access to the profession. First Amendment challenges to
unauthorized practice rules- complicated by definitional opacity" -have
mainly centered on the question of whether individuals may disseminate
certain "information" (as distinct from professional "advice"). Here, unlike in
the professional speech context, however, regulation polices the formation of a
professional-client relationship rather than the communication of professional
advice within such a relationship.
227. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 987.
228. Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23
SEAYTLE U. L. REv. 885, 888 (2000).
229. But see id. at 889 (asserting that "the license requirement arguably acts as a prior restraint on
speech").
230. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
231. See id.; Storied Law Professor George Anastaplo Dies, HYDE PARK HERALD (Feb.
19, 2014), http://hpherald.com/2ol4/o2/19/storied-law-professor-george-anastaplo-dies
[http://perma.cc/X2YT-MJ8F].
232. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text (distinguishing professional speech from
private speech of the professional).
233. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note 65, at 261-65 (discussing the failed efforts to define "practice of
law").
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The state regulations just discussed establish the boundaries of
professional-client discourse without directly affecting its content. Structurally,
they define the speakers' "social roles" within the "specific communicative
relationship."' In this respect, Halberstam correctly observes that
"government regulation is not invariably destructive of communicative
interests, but may indeed foster the communicative relationship and assist in
institutionalizing the bounded discourse.""s In other words, "content-based
government regulation may enhance, rather than compromise, the speech
practice.",,3 6 Yet, as already discussed, this structural understanding does not
go far enough in determining the substance of the bounded discourse - the
knowledge community's insights provide this dimension.
In sum, then, state regulation may limit access to the professions or what
professionals may do in certain circumstances. The wishes of the professions in
these respects may be laudable or not. But as long as state regulation remains
disconnected from the knowledge that forms the basis of the professionals'
advice, it does not pose the type of First Amendment professional speech
problems I am concerned with here. State regulation of the professions is far
from unproblematic, but the problems that arise are not of the same kind as
those directly concerning professional speech- that is, the communication of
the knowledge community's insights, within the professional-client
relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice. The mere fact
that the state may regulate the professions therefore has little bearing on the
question of First Amendment protection for professional speech.
B. Tort Liability
The tort regime directly addresses harms caused by "unprofessional"
speech, that is, bad professional advice. Conventionally, the relationship
between the First Amendment and professional malpractice liability- in this
case, medical malpractice - is framed as follows:
Medical activity that consists primarily of speech does not automatically
deserve First Amendment protection. There are instances when speech
essentially amounts to the practice of medicine and could be considered
a regulated activity. For example, physician advice regarding the
necessity or wisdom of a particular surgical procedure could give rise to
z34. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 869.
235. Id.




malpractice liability, which many would agree has few First
Amendment implications even though the advice is itself speech.3
But this common framing is not entirely accurate in light of the role the
knowledge community plays.
Juxtaposing professional speech protection and professional malpractice
liability leads to conceptual inaccuracy. It is an exaggeration to assert that
professional speech is not-and ought not be-protected because the
professional is subject to tort liability for "unprofessional" speech. The contrast
between permissible regulation and protection is not as stark as it is commonly
portrayed- and the two are certainly not irreconcilable. In fact, as already
indicated, they are complementary. Protection and liability are best
conceptualized as two sides of the same coin, and the substantive content of
both is determined by the insights of the knowledge community.
1. Professional Malpractice
It is correctly understood that " [m]alpractice law protects the vulnerability
of clients by requiring professionals to maintain strict standards of expert
knowledge." 9 But the imposition of liability for professional malpractice is
not actually the same as regulation of the profession, or even a limit on
professional speech in the strict sense of that term. Malpractice liability ensures
that the professional's speech accurately communicates the knowledge
community's insights within the professional-client relationship. On the flip
side, "unprofessional" speech is unprotected.4o
Post explains the connection between malpractice liability and professional
knowledge as follows:
as7. Wells, supra note 30, at 1739 n.83; see also Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at
961 ("Professional medical speech is continuously regulated without seeming to run afoul of
First Amendment constraints. Doctors are sanctioned for engaging in certain
communicative acts and they are compelled to engage in others.").
238. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 868 (noting that "government regulation and First Amendment
protection are not mutually exclusive concepts").
239. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5i, at 47.
24o. Cf Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2364 ("[C]ontent-based
regulation of speech is routinely enforced without special constitutional scrutiny, as
for example when lawyers or doctors are held liable in professional malpractice for
the communication of irresponsible opinions."); Volokh, supra note 5, at 1347 ("Some
speech ... is indeed unprotected, for reasons related to why criminal law or tort law seeks to
punish it.").
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[M]alpractice law outside of public discourse rigorously polices the
authority of disciplinary knowledge. It underwrites the competence of
experts. Doctors, dentists, lawyers, or architects who offer what
authoritative professional standards would regard as incompetent
advice to their clients face strict legal regulation. In such contexts, law
stands as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert pronouncements.
By guaranteeing that clients can plan to rely on expert professional
judgment, law endows such communication with the status of
knowledge."
Post's presentation is compelling. But it has some unstated premises. In
particular, for his gloss to be correct, the knowledge community must decide
for itself what "disciplinary truth" is, and any outside interference with their
determination ought to be met with great skepticism.
This is already implicit in the way malpractice liability works. The standard
of care against which a given professional is judged to determine malpractice
liability is whether she has exercised the profession according to the degree and
skill of a well-qualified professional. A lawyer "must exercise the competence
and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.""
Likewise, "a doctor commits malpractice when he treats a patient in a way that
deviates from the norms established by the medical profession."" It is thus the
knowledge community that determines the standard of care. Moreover, only
the knowledge community's specific insights matter. Deference is thus
awarded to the core knowledge, not to peripheral interests.' This mirrors
conceptually the First Amendment interests of the knowledge community and
its members.
There may be variations as to who constitutes the appropriate reference
group (i.e. whether a national standard or a local standard is applied as the
baseline)." But the technical approach is generally the same: a professional
241. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 44-45.
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (AM. LAw INST. 2000).
243. Stein, supra note 22, at 1209.
24. Id. at 1243 ("Rules that the profession is authorized to make need to utilize medical
knowledge to diagnose and cure patients. Those rules consequently must be based on
medical reasons. Courts scrutinize those reasons for minimal plausibility to make sure that
the profession's rules are not blatantly unsafe to patients. Furthermore, the profession has
no exclusive authority to base its rules of patient treatment upon reasons extraneous to
medicine. Correspondingly, courts fully scrutinize the profession's non-medical reasons and
decisions.").
245. See, e.g., id. at 1210 (asserting that in the medical malpractice context, "the locality




standard is juxtaposed against the individual professional's activities. 6 The
imposition of liability does not encompass which specific advice may be given.
It only asks whether the advice rendered is appropriate as a matter of
professional care. 4 7 As one commentator points out in the medical malpractice
context, "the medical profession single-handedly determines the entries into
treatment-related liability for malpractice." 8
The extent of liability under the common law should be congruent with the
scope of protection of the knowledge community's discourse under the First
Amendment. Only if liability and protection are coextensive can this liability
mechanism yield fair results. If liability is properly measured against the
standard of care determined by the profession, the knowledge community's
formation of this standard should remain uncorrupted and its application
within the professional-client relationship should receive robust First
Amendment protection. Post hinted at this mechanism in asserting that "we
should expect to see First Amendment coverage triggered whenever
government seeks . . . to disrupt the communication of accurate expert
knowledge.""
2. Informed Consent
Independent of the professional malpractice claim, a separate cause of
action exists in the medical context based on the physician's duty to inform the
patient of relevant information relating to the treatment.so There is a troubling
history of paternalism in the medical profession that limited the amount of
information shared with patients.2 s' But the last century has seen the
note 31, at 118o-81 (discussing the emergence of the locality rule in medical malpractice and
tracing its origin to the case Hathorn v. Raymond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876)).
246. Stein, supra note 22, at 1239-40 (discussing medical malpractice).
247. Id. at 1240-41 ("Courts and legislators do not know medicine and are consequently
not competent to devise rules for medical diagnoses and treatments. . . . [Instead, they
delegate] the rulemaking power to an institutionally competent rulemaker-the medical
profession. . . . All jurisdictions across the United States require care providers to treat
patients in accordance with the rules, protocols, and practices that have been devised by the
medical profession.").
248. Id. at 1235.
249. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 48.
250. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
251. Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common-Law Protection for
Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 509-10 (1998); Sonia M. Suter, The Politics
of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and End-of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7, 12 (2013) ("Historically, physicians disclosed medical information only to persuade
patients to do what physicians thought was best for them or to try to offer hope and
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recognition of patients' autonomy interests and, as a result, significant changes
in the doctor-patient relationship.2 s2 "Autonomy soon became the driving
principle used to resolve issues within medicine,"11 3 and, with it, "informed
consent doctrine . . . driven in large part by a desire to combat the paternalism
of medicine.""
The doctrinal origins of informed consent are often traced to a 1914 New
York Court of Appeals decision authored by then-Judge Cardozo in which he
stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body . .. "2s The real turn toward
information, however, occurred in decisions from the 1970s. In Canterbury v.
Spence, emblematic of the trend, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the need for
information in self-determination.5 Accordingly, this shift was accompanied
by a shift in the treatment of informed consent from sounding in battery to
negligence. 5 7
There is continued debate over whether the current tort paradigm
appropriately accounts for patients' interests, or whether it continues to be too
physician-centric. Courts have adopted a negligence approach to informed
consent with "the principle of self-determination as the bedrock of modern
informed consent doctrine."259 But the variations that persist tend to value
comfort. Indeed, deception in certain cases was not only acceptable, but sometimes
considered necessary, to achieve those goals.").
252. Suter, supra note 251, at 12-13.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id. at 15-
255. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see also Suter, supra note
251, at 11-17 (providing an overview of the doctrinal development of informed consent).
256. See 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
257. Suter, supra note 251, at 12.
58. See Northern, supra note 251, at 510-11. Some also argue that the law overemphasizes patient
autonomy. See Suter, supra note 251, at 16 (summarizing Schneider and Ben-Shahar's
objections); see also Stein, supra note 22, at 1227 ("Consider doctors' provision of medical
information to their patients. When a doctor keeps her patient uninformed about the
available treatment options and the chosen treatment, she may-and often will-achieve a
medically outstanding result: she may actually cure the patient completely. Whether the
doctor achieves this result depends on what she knows, not on what the patient knows. The
doctor's failure to properly inform the patient about the treatment consequently damages
the patient's autonomy, but not her anatomy.").
259. Northern, supra note 251, at 511; see also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 196o)
("Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical




either the physician's role or the patient's autonomy more heavily. o The two
standards are the reasonable patient standard and the reasonable physician
standard. 6 '
With respect to the First Amendment, then, "[a]ny physician who has been
held liable for failure to obtain the informed consent of his patient could argue
that the law impairs his autonomy because it requires him to speak in ways that
he would prefer not to." But here, too, the knowledge community's
standards limit the extent to which a physician could reasonably assert such a
thing. This is because "the scope of disclosure is bound only by what is
material to medical, as opposed to non-medical, interests. Cabining the
information that physicians must disclose to that which is material to patients'
medical decisions avoids holding physicians accountable for matters that go
beyond their expertise." 6 ' It is again the knowledge community's professional
knowledge that circumscribes the relevant information. 6 ' And it is therefore
necessary to keep the knowledge community's information-formation process
free from outside interference. Thus, imposing an informed consent
requirement does not technically restrict the professional's First Amendment
rights if appropriate disclosure is considered a part of medically necessary
information flow within the doctor-patient relationship. It is "unprofessional"
speech - or "unprofessional" silence- that is punished.
IV. WHEN PROFESSIONS SPEAK
When state regulation directly targets "unprofessional" speech as a matter
of tort liability, as discussed in the previous Part, it ensures that information
consistent with the knowledge community's insights is conveyed. As long as
state regulation reinforces the knowledge community's insights -which it does
when the knowledge community's standard is applied as the liability
benchmark-no significant problems arise. State regulation delineates the
professional-client relationship. And state regulation appropriately tracks
concerns related to safeguarding the flow of accurate information from the
necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
patient by any form of artifice or deception.").
26o. See Northern, supra note 251, at 511-13 (contrasting the "medical paternalism" and "patient
sovereignty" models in the medical decision-making process).
261. See Suter, supra note 251, at 14.
262. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 973.
263. Suter, supra note 251, at 15 (footnote omitted).
264. Cf id. at 15-16 ("[T]he law is reluctant to intrude too much into the medical decision-
making process. Courts struggle to strike a balance that promotes autonomy while
preserving some element of professional discretion for physicians.").
1289
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
knowledge community through the conduit of the individual professional.26 5
As is well understood in the literature, "[g]overnment regulation and licensing
of the profession as well as the legal enforcement of professional norms thus
may assist in establishing the trust that patients can place in their
physicians." ,6Indeed, "content-based government regulation may enhance,
rather than compromise, the speech practice."6' But this is only true as long as
the regulation mirrors, and does not contradict, professional norms.
When the state overreaches, significant problems arise. This is the
fundamental problem with new types of state regulation we are seeing now.
This Part demonstrates how the knowledge community-focused theory of
professional speech works when applied to controversial First Amendment
questions, returning to the cases referenced at the outset.6 Some of these
regulations directly target and attempt to alter the core of the knowledge
community's insights and their communication from professional to client.
The following three sections illustrate a spectrum of regulations that defer to
the professional standard, (partially) codify the professional standard, or
compel professionals to speak in a manner that contradicts the professional
standards of the knowledge community (or prohibits the professional from
communicating the knowledge community's insights). These forms of
regulatory interaction between legislatures and knowledge communities
suggest that state regulation of the professions can sometimes be supportive of
professional speech rights and sometimes be in tension with them.
The types of facts relevant in professional speech cases -as in a variety of
other constitutional cases that turn on questions of fact-"are not of the
'whodunit' variety of what happened between the parties. They are instead
more generalized facts about the world: Is a partial-birth abortion ever
medically necessary?"2 69 Or, in the professional speech context, is legal advice
to load up on debt in anticipation of bankruptcy always fraudulent? Is SOCE
therapy harmful? Does terminating a pregnancy result in an increased risk of
suicide? The crux lies in determining whose knowledge we should rely on to
provide answers.
265. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 844-45.
266. Id. at 844.
267. Id. at 868. Further, Halberstam explains, "[G]overnment regulation is not invariably
destructive of communicative interests, but may indeed foster the communicative
relationship and assist in institutionalizing the bounded discourse." Id. at 869.
268. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing SOCE therapy and suicide
advisories).
269. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2012)




The following discussion is embedded in a larger jurisprudential context. A
long-standing typology distinguishes between legislative and adjudicative
facts.7 Legislative facts are not only the facts found by legislatures in enacting
legislation but also the facts that adjudicative bodies find to apply beyond the
confines of a particular case." The distinction has important implications for
the questions of fact review that come into sharp relief when findings of fact
deviate from the knowledge community's insights. The following discussion
considers how First Amendment theory plays out in litigation, a problem that
has not traditionally received much attention from First Amendment theorists.
In doing so, it takes into account important aspects of procedure surrounding
the litigation of First Amendment claims."
A. Deference to the Professional Standard
In Milavetz, the Court upheld the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) relying in part on the grounds that it
aligned with the profession's own definition of permissible communication
within the lawyer-client relationship." Interpreting the restriction on attorney
speech from the perspective of the knowledge community ensured that
professional speech concerns did not arise.
From the First Amendment perspective, this approach constitutionalizes
the professional standard. This happens in other doctrinal areas as well. In
Sixth Amendment doctrine, for instance, the right to effective counsel to a
certain degree constitutionalizes professional standards.274 Thus, in Padilla v.
Kentucky, the Court noted that "[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms
supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation."' 5 Beyond applying professional standards in effective counsel
270. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HAPv. L. REV. 537, 549-60 (1949).
271. Larsen, supra note 269, at 1256-57.
272. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518
(1970) (discussing procedural guarantees in free speech protection).
273. Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246-47 (2010). See supra notes 110-126 and
accompanying text.
274. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("[The Sixth Amendment]
relies .. . on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment
envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms." (citation omitted)).
275. 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010).
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cases,27 6 this conceptual approach aligns speech regulations in a manner
consistent with First Amendment protection of professional speech. This
"constitutionaliz[ation] of individuals' professional roles"27 goes beyond
delineating the professional-client relationship. It gives the relationship
substantive content by deferring to the knowledge community's insights.
It also has procedural implications.'8 Here, it is important to note as
a threshold matter that the Supreme Court "never set forth a general test
to determine when a procedural safeguard is required by the First
Amendment."27 9 Yet "[t]he institutional characteristics of the American judicial
system are . .. of central importance in realizing the constitutional
guarantees."28' Reconceptualizing the role of the professions as knowledge
communities, and advancing a theory of professional speech as I propose, has
significant implications for the allocation of authority in the judicial process.
The integrity of professional advice is protected by the First Amendment,
as well as by ordinary tort law, which subjects "unprofessional" advice to
malpractice liability. But whereas in an ordinary tort law case the jury verdict is
conclusive, First Amendment protection of the professional standard gives the
professional potentially valuable legal protection. At a procedural level,
constitutionalizing the professional standard hands important questions to the
judge. On review, these questions are subject to independent assessment of the
facts by the court. The resulting procedural allocation of fact review takes
account of the interest in maintaining the integrity of professional speech."
Ultimately, the knowledge community-focused theory of professional speech
results in a significant shift of decision-making and review authority to the
judge. This gives procedural protections to the professional who speaks in
276. See Knake, supra note 25, at 682-83 (discussing the role of professional standards in Sixth
Amendment cases).
277. Cf Halberstam, supra note 1, at 870.
278. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is important to
ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that
they are applied through reliable procedures. This is why we have often held some
procedures -a particular allocation of the burden of proof, a particular quantum of proof,
a particular type of appellate review, and so on- to be constitutionally required in
proceedings that may penalize protected speech."); id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("I do not doubt that the First Amendment contains within it some procedural
prescriptions . . . .").
279. Id. at 671 (plurality opinion).
28o. Monaghan, supra note 272, at 523.
281. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he propriety of a proposed procedure
must turn on the particular context in which the question arises-on the cost of the
procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it would
decrease and increase.").
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accordance with the knowledge community's insights, but does not protect the
professional who fails to do so.
The justification for contracting the jury's role flows directly from the First
Amendment interests underlying professional speech, discussed in Part II. The
fundamental interest lies in accurately communicating the knowledge
community's insights to a client seeking professional advice. Whether speech is
protected as professional speech rests on whether it accurately conveys the
knowledge community's insights.
B. Codification of the Professional Standard
California's SOCE ban8' and similar legislation modeled after it*
arguably "tread[] on ill-defined areas of First Amendment law."8'* Following
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the California cases upholding the
ban against First Amendment challenges, the ban will go into effect,2" and
legislatures elsewhere may be emboldened to enact similar legislation."
282. An Act To Add Article 15 (Commencing with Section 865) to Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the
Business and Professions Code, Relating to Healing Arts, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569 (codified at
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865-865.2 (West 2015)).
283. The New Jersey SOCE ban, N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 4S:1-55 (West 2015), for instance, is modeled
after the California statute. Victor, supra note 84, at 1536.
284. Victor, supra note 84, at 1536 (arguing that therefore California's SOCE ban "is particularly
amenable to First Amendment challenges").
28. David S. Joachim, Supreme Court Declines Case Contesting Ban on Gay "Conversion Therapy,"
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/07/oi/us/supreme-court
-declines-case-contesting-ban-on-gay-conversion-therapy.html [http://perma.cc/7CJQ
-MJTV].
286. The District of Columbia, Illinois, and Oregon have since banned conversion therapy
on minors. See Aditya Agrawal, Illinois Bans Conversion Therapy for Minors, TIME
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://time.conT/4oo6675/illinois-bans-gay-conversion-therapy-on-minors
[http://perma.cc/L937-7656]; Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Bans Gay Conversion Therapy of
Minors, WASH. PosT (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc
-bans-gay-conversion-therapy/2o14/12/o2/58e6aae4-7a67-11e4-84d4-7c896b9oabdc-story.h
tml [http://perma.cc/BLJ4-CBEF]; Katy Steinmetz, Oregon Becomes Third State To Ban
Conversion Therapy on Minors, TIME (May 19, 2015), http://time.com/3889687/oregon
-conversion-therapy-ban [http://perma.cc/YS8R-KCQ2]. States that actively considered
legislative efforts to ban conversion therapy in 2015 are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. See #BornPerfect: Laws & Legislation by
State, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (2015), http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws
-legislation-by-state [http://perma.cc/CTJ3-JFXM] (providing an overview of state
legislative activity regarding conversion therapy).
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The Ninth Circuit held the SOCE ban to regulate conduct rather than
speech. 8 ' Following the Ninth Circuit, a federal district court in New Jersey
likewise concluded that that state's SOCE ban does not regulate speech but
conduct. 8 8 However, "the 'conduct-speech' distinction is likely to be more
misleading than helpful here. When the government restricts professionals
from speaking to their clients, it's restricting speech, not conduct."28 Creating
a circuit split on the issue, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit
in holding that conversion therapy is speech.29 o I contend that the Ninth
Circuit and the Third Circuit rightly upheld the respective SOCE bans, though
for the wrong reasons.' Under my account, the activity regulated by the
SOCE legislation -"talk therapy" -is speech.2 92 But as professional speech, it is
a specific kind of speech. It is the speech that communicates a knowledge
community's insights within a professional-client relationship for the purpose
of providing professional advice.
The California and New Jersey legislatures enacted their findings by
referring to various professional organizations' statements on SOCE.293
Nonetheless, the codification approach is not entirely unproblematic. For one,
287. Pickup I, 728 F.3d at 1048.
288. King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 313-20.
289. Volokh, supra note S, at 1346 ("Such regulation may be valid because of the harm that
negligent speech can cause, the potential value of the mandated speech to the patient or to
third parties, or the risk that the speech may exploit the patient's psychological dependency
on the speaker-but not because the regulated speech is somehow conduct.").
29o. King II, 767 F.3d at 228-29.
291. For alternative approaches to SOCE regulation, see, for example, Shawn L. Fultz,
Comment, IfIt Quacks Like a Duck: Reviewing Health Care Providers' Speech Restrictions Under
the First Prong of Central Hudson, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 567 (2013); and Victor, supra note 84, at
1562-81. See also Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children's Right To Be Queer, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 425 (2013); Elizabeth Bookwalter, Comment, Getting It Straight: A First
Amendment Analysis of California's Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts and Its Potential
Effects on Abortion Regulations, 22 J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 451 (2014) (discussing Pickup I);
William Travis, Case Note, Bad Medicine: The Ninth Circuit Reviews Issues of Free Speech,
Professional Regulations, and California's Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts in Pickup v.
Brown, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 191 (2014).
292. This discussion is not concerned with physically invasive forms of SOCE therapy.
293. An Act To Add Article is (Commencing with Section 865) to Chapter i of Division 2 of the
Business and Professions Code, Relating to Healing Arts, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569 (codified at
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 865-865.2 (West 2015)); An Act Concerning the Protection of
Minors from Attempts To Change Sexual Orientation and Supplementing Title 45 of the





there is the problem of legislative findings." The bill passed by the California
legislature entangles the factual and normative elements typical for legislative
findings: "Being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness,
deficiency, or shortcoming. The major professional associations of mental
health practitioners and researchers in the United States have recognized this
fact for nearly 40 years."" Instead of deferring entirely to the knowledge
community, the legislature adopts a factual assertion as the premise underlying
the legislation. In this instance, the premise is shared by the knowledge
community, but it is conceivable that a legislature may enact as a legislative
finding a position that has not yet reached majority status or consensus within
the knowledge community. In the most egregious instances, as discussed in the
next section, the legislative findings may be diametrically opposed to the
knowledge community's insights.
Some suggest that there is no consensus within the "psychological
establishment" regarding the harms of talk-therapy SOCE.296 Thus,
"[a]ccounting only for clinical evidence of SOCE's harmfulness could, at least
at this point, rationalize only a ban on physical interventions like aversion
therapy . . . ."2 But it is difficult for both legislatures and courts to evaluate
the scientific literature and determine whether a consensus exists. Here, the
more workable approach is to defer to the knowledge community. Indeed, the
APA follows a broad definition of harm caused by SOCE therapy.'s The
legislature may rightly defer to that professional standard. As a corollary, we
would also expect tort liability for licensed professionals who engage in
conversion therapy.'99 Yet the codification approach may prove inefficient. In
order to accurately reflect the knowledge community's insights, the statute has
294. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84
IND. L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the judicial treatment of legislative fact-finding and proposing
a new paradigm for judicial review of social facts); Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative
Findings and the Deference Problem, 1o2 GEo. L.J. 637 (2014) (discussing judicial deference to
enacted and unenacted legislative fact-finding).
295. § i(a), 2012 Cal. Stat. at 6569.
296. Victor, supra note 84, at 1546.
297. Id. at 1545-46.
298. Victor, supra note 84, at 1539 ("This broad definition of SOCE is generally in keeping with
the approach of organizations like the American Psychological Association (APA), which has
treated SOCE as a cohesive category that encompasses any attempt by a mental health
professional to change sexual orientation.").
299. Others have argued in favor of a cause of action under the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation
Conversion Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 245-46 (1999).
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to be flexible over time, since the knowledge community's insights might
change.3 oo
Consider here also the ban's limited scope. In addition to the legislature
having to choose among scientific opinions that may not be entirely clear
within the profession, the legislation's limited scope might raise concerns. If
the knowledge community deems conversion therapy harmful for everyone,
limiting the ban to minors may not properly reflect the knowledge
community's insights.30 ' On the one hand, the underinclusiveness resulting
from the law's limited reach might be seen as First Amendment protective: less
speech is restricted. On the other hand, under the knowledge communities-
centered theory of professional speech I offer, it raises the problem of selective
enactment. Under my account of coextensive liability and protection, consider
an adult patient who receives conversion therapy, which is not prohibited by
the legislation. The adult later suffers adverse effects and sues the mental
health provider for malpractice. Given the statute's limited reach, the mental
health provider might invoke the First Amendment as a defense. But if the
First Amendment is properly understood as protecting the knowledge
community's insights and their subsequent communication and if malpractice
liability properly mirrors that understanding by sanctioning "unprofessional"
speech, the limited scope of the statute should be of no help to the mental
health provider.
How would the theory of professional speech offered here play out in
practice? Consider first the example in which a licensed mental health provider
(a) wants to engage in conversion therapy- attempting to use the First
Amendment as a sword (as in Pickup) - or (b) engages in conversion therapy
and, under the ban, faces revocation of her license and attempts to use the First
Amendment as a shield. Consider then a second example in which a licensed
psychologist engages in conversion therapy and is sued for malpractice by a
patient. o2
In the two scenarios set out in the first example, the procedural story would
play out as follows: In (a), the licensed mental health provider would argue
that SOCE is protected under the First Amendment. The question of First
300. Cf Stein, supra note 22, at i24o (discussing similar concerns in the medical malpractice
context).
301. See Victor, supra note 84, at 1572 ("The proponents of SB 1172 [2012 Cal. Stat. 6569)
originally favored more comprehensive legislation, which would have mandated that
practitioners receive a non-minor patient's 'informed consent' before commencing SOCE
treatments, but later withdrew these proposals.").
302. An earlier version of California's SB 1172 "included provisions allowing former or current
SOCE patients to sue a therapist engaging in SOCE." Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347,




Amendment coverage is one for the judge. If professional speech coverage is
determined by deference to the knowledge community, the judge will not find
that SOCE is protected under the First Amendment as a matter of professional
speech. In scenario (b), the licensed mental health provider would argue that
revocation of the license is impermissible because the SOCE ban infringes on
her First Amendment rights, and the subsequent events would unfold as in
scenario (a). The shift to the judge is mirrored in the malpractice example.
Only "unprofessional" speech is subject to malpractice liability. Professional
speech - that is, communication of the knowledge community's insights within
the professional-client relationship for the purpose of providing professional
advice - however, is not.
C. Compelled Speech Contradicting the Professional Standard
The most problematic-and, under this theory of professional speech, most
likely impermissible - type of regulation is one in which the state either
demands that the professional communicate information that is incompatible
with the knowledge community's insights or prohibits the professional from
communicating the knowledge community's insights. 3 ' In addition to
offending the individual professional's interest in communicating accurate and
relevant professional information, these types of regulation also offend the
knowledge community's interests in having its insights disseminated
accurately by members of the profession.o An example of compelling the
professional to convey inaccurate information is the informed consent
requirement at issue in the Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota v. Rounds litigation, in which physicians have to inform patients of an
"[i]ncreased risk of . .. suicide."3 os An example of the state prohibiting the
professional from communicating accurate information to the client is on
display in the medical marijuana cases. Similar problems arise when the state
determines what constitutes relevant information, such as in the mandatory
ultrasound cases, or attempts to proscribe some information as irrelevant, a
constellation that recently arose in Florida, where doctors are prohibited from
inquiring about gun use or ownership. I address these examples in turn.
303. See Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 978-79 ("If First Amendment concerns
arise whenever the state proscribes physician speech in ways that prevent physician-patient
relationships from serving as a source of accurate, reliable, professional knowledge,
constitutional questions should also arise if the state corrupts physician speech by requiring
doctors to transmit misleading information in the context of informed consent.").
304. See supra Part II.
305. See Rounds II, 686 F.3 d at 892 (en banc) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 34-23A-
10.1(1)(e) (ii) (2015) (alteration in original)).
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The suicide advisory at issue in the Rounds litigation represents a recent
instance of direct state interference with the knowledge community's insights.
A South Dakota statute requires "the disclosure to patients seeking abortions of
an increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.,,6o The district court and a
panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the suicide advisory infringed doctors'
First Amendment rights."0 7 The South Dakota statute required doctors to
disclose "all known medical risks of abortion."3os The Eighth Circuit panel
emphasized the importance of the word "known." It crucially noted:
"Legislatures have 'wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty,' but the suicide advisory asserts certainty on
the issue of medical and scientific knowledge where none exists."o' What is
"known" as a matter of professional knowledge is for the knowledge
community to decide, not the state legislature.
On partial rehearing en banc, limited to the issue of the suicide advisory,
however, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the required disclosure of
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide was truthful, non-misleading, and
relevant.31 o The en banc plurality stressed the state's ability to regulate in the
face of "medical and scientific uncertainty," " relying on Gonzales v. Carhart,"
and demand that physicians provide the suicide advisory. 13 But two separate
concurrences interpreted the plurality's opinion to "require only a disclosure as
to relative risk that the physician can adapt to fit his or her professional opinion of
the conflicting medical research on this contentious subject"" and that "the
physician [is] free to augment that description [of the relative risks as reflected
in the peer-reviewed literature] based on his or her professional judgment."131 The
concurrences thus give somewhat more weight to professional knowledge and
deference to the individual professional.
306. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23a-1o.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015)) (alteration omitted).
307. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 1), 653 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir.
2011) ("By compelling untruthful and misleading speech, the advisory also violates doctors'
First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech that is untruthful, misleading, or
irrelevant.").
3o8. Id. at 670.
309. Id. at 672 (citation omitted).
31o. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 905.
311. Id. at 904 (citation omitted).
312. 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
313. Rounds II, 686 F- 3d at 904-oS. But see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F-3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014)(offering a strong critique of this use of Carhart).
314. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 906 (Loken, J., concurring) (emphasis added).




One critic of Rounds II suggests that "the Eighth Circuit should have
performed a more robust First Amendment inquiry, calibrated toward ensuring
clinically and professionally appropriate speech within the doctor-patient
relationship." , 6 Doing so would have required the court to anchor its inquiry
in a theory of professional speech. My theory would allow it to do so. Under
the theory I propose, the knowledge community's insights are the first element
of professional speech. In deciding whether the speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the judge would have to determine whether the knowledge
community's insights are being communicated.
The suicide advisory controversy also illustrates the problem of using
terminology in legislative fact-finding that may be inconsistent with the
knowledge community's usage. The South Dakota statute "used 'risk factor' in
a manner inconsistent with its medical meaning, leaving doctors 'to guess as to
the meaning the legislature intended to give to the phrase."" The district
court noted that "the legislative drafters 'may not have fully understood the
meaning of this phrase as used in the medical profession.'"13"S Deference to the
profession avoids confusion as to the meaning of terms of art within the
discourse of the knowledge community.
The contemporaneous reproductive rights controversy over mandatory
ultrasounds, while compelling doctors to speak in a state-mandated manner,
is slightly different in that it does not require the disclosure of false
information.319 Rather, it demands the communication of irrelevant
information toward an arguably nonscientific ideological end (dissuading
women from obtaining an otherwise legal professional service).32o As
compelled ideological speech, it suggests proper First Amendment analysis
316. Recent Case, First Amendment- Compelled Speech-Eighth Circuit Applies Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey to South Dakota "Suicide Advisory"-
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012) (en banc), 126 HARv. L. REV. 1438, 1438 (2013).
317. Rounds 1, 653 F. 3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
318. Id.
319. Compare Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.
2012) (upholding mandatory sonogram requirement), with Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp.
2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding mandatory ultrasound law violates First Amendment),
afd sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238 (4 th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker-
McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
320. See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242 ("This compelled speech ... is ideological in intent and in
kind."); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (zoo8) ("[M]andatory ultrasound is ... meant to persuade
women against abortion.").
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should be based on the principles set forth in Wooley v. MaynardP' and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.' But the Fifth Circuit upheld a
Texas mandatory ultrasound and sonogram statute as "the epitome of truthful,
non-misleading information" that can be required by the state in the course of
regulating medical practice.' The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, struck down a
similar piece of North Carolina legislationp Judge Wilkinson did note that
"[t]his compelled speech . . . is a regulation of the medical profession."3s
Nonetheless, it "extend[s] well beyond" the measures the state has ordinarily
employed to ensure informed consent.2 6 In the end, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the regulation as compelled speech violating the First Amendment. In
so doing, the court "borrow[ed] a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard
used in certain commercial speech cases."" Yet, as discussed in Section I.C
above, that analogy is unsatisfactory. Thus, while the Fourth Circuit reaches
the right outcome in the case, it does so on feeble theoretical footing. The
Texas and North Carolina mandatory ultrasound regulations represent
precisely the new type of aggressive state regulation directly targeting
professional-client communications. Under the knowledge community-
focused theory of professional speech, the professional is to decide what is
relevant professional information. The knowledge community's insights not
only determine what accurate information is, but also what is relevant in any
given situation according to the specific circumstances of the client.
The flip side of compelling professionals to make statements that do not
correspond to the knowledge community's insights is prohibiting them from
giving accurate advice. One prominent example involves the threat to
"prosecute physicians, revoke their prescription licenses, and deny them
participation in Medicare and Medicaid for recommending medical
marijuana.",,8 Prohibiting this type of professional communication raised the
321. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding mandatory display of "Live Free or Die" motto on license plate
unconstitutional as compelled speech).
322. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory flag salute unconstitutional as compelled speech);
see Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255 (citing Wooley and Barnette); see also Caroline Mala Corbin,
Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277 (2014) (discussing mandatory ultrasounds in light
of compelled speech doctrine).
323. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578.
324. Stuart, 7 7 4 F.3d at 256.
325. Id. at 242; see also id. at 252 ("[I]t imposes a virtually unprecedented burden on the right of
professional speech that operates to the detriment of both speaker and listener.").
326. Id. at 242.
327. Id. at 248.
328. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1997), affd sub nom. Conant v.




question of the extent to which regulation of professional speech is permissible
under the First Amendment."' The district court held that "the First
Amendment protects physician-patient communication up until the point that
it becomes criminal . . . ."33 Therefore, "[t]he First Amendment allows
physicians to discuss and advocate medical marijuana, even though use of
marijuana itself is illegal."' The Ninth Circuit affirmed."3 2
Under the theory of professional speech advanced here, communication
about the medical benefits of marijuana use would be protected as a matter of
professional speech. Even if insights regarding the benefits of marijuana were
not uniformly shared within the knowledge community, 33 communicating
them within the physician-patient relationship does not offend the knowledge
community's insights in the way communicating erroneous statements does.
This highlights the difference between unclear (or emerging and as yet
untested) insights and false (tested and rejected) assertions. It is for the
knowledge community to decide the content of its insights rather than for the
state to determine them. The legislatively enshrined Rounds suicide advisory
thus patently offends the professional knowledge formation and dissemination
process. So does the classification of marijuana as a drug listed in Schedule I of
the Controlled Substances Act, according to which it has "no currently
accepted medical use.""
Just as the state may not decide for professionals what constitutes relevant
information and compel them to communicate it (as in the mandatory
ultrasound example), the state may not decide in their stead what constitutes
irrelevant information and prohibit professionals from communicating it. The
State of Florida, for instance, prohibits doctors from asking questions about
329. Walters, 309 F.3 d at 634.
330. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. at 701.
331. Id. at 695.
332. Walters, 309 F.3d at 639.
333. Editorial, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-marijuana-legalization.html [http://
perma.cc/8P8D-Q8WZ] ("There is honest debate among scientists about the health effects
of marijuana. . . .").
334. David Firestone, Let States Decide on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMEs (July 26, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/Opinion/sunday/high-time-let-states-decide-on-marijuana.h
tml [http://perma.cc/HM2F-6VQF] ("No medical use? That would come as news to the
millions of people who have found that marijuana helped them through the pain of AIDS,
or the nausea and vomiting of chemotherapy, or the seizures of epilepsy.").
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guns as a matter of course.33 s The Eleventh Circuit held this restriction on a
professional's speech to be constitutional as "a legitimate regulation of
professional conduct." 3 Just as the state may impose malpractice liability "for
all manner of activity that the state deems bad medicine," 3 1 it may decide "that
good medical care does not require inquiry . . . regarding firearms when
unnecessary to a patient's care.",, Under the court's view, it is thus up to the
state to determine what constitutes appropriate care.
But it is misleading to assert, as the Eleventh Circuit did, that the state
imposes liability for activities that the state deems bad medicine. Rather, the
state's imposition of liability should track what the knowledge community deems
bad medicine. 339 Applying the knowledge community-focused theory of
professional speech proposed here, the state legislature impermissibly deemed
all routine inquiries concerning firearms to be irrelevant. Under this theory, it
is for the professional to decide - based on the knowledge community's
insights-what constitutes relevant information within the professional-client
relationship.
These examples illustrate how the exchange of information between a client
and a professional suffers in the face of regulatory overreach. A focus on the
role of the knowledge community's body of knowledge brings the attendant
distortions into sharp relief. As demonstrated above, the fundamental defect in
these types of regulation is the direct state interference with the content of the
body of professional knowledge itself.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, some professionals speak a lot: "Most of what many
lawyers, investment advisors, accountants, psychotherapists, and even doctors
do is speech."" 0 It is therefore all the more troubling that there has not yet
been a comprehensive theory of professional speech advanced in the courts and
335. Wollschlaeger I, 76o F.3 d 1195; see also Paul Sherman & Robert McNamara, Editorial,
Censorship in Your Doctor's Office, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2o14
/o8/o2/opinion/censorship-in-your-doctors-office.htmI [http://perma.cc/D3GF-LSPU].
336. Wollschlaeger I, 760 F.3d at 1203.
337. Id.
338. Id.
33g. See supra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
34o. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1343; see also Schauer, supra note 202, at 688 ("As lawyers, speech is
our stock in trade. Speech is all we have."); Tarkington, supra note 25, at 37 ("Attorneys




the legal literature. Understanding the nature of the professions as knowledge
communities allows us to reconceptualize this type of speech.
State regulation interacts with knowledge communities' insights in
multiple and varied ways. Sometimes it aligns with professional insights;
sometimes it contradicts them. If state regulation aims to interfere with
and alter professional knowledge, the First Amendment should protect the
client's as well as the professional's interest in accurate communication of the
knowledge community's insights when a professional speaks.
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